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CLEARINGHOUSES AS LIQUIDITY PARTITIONING
Richard Squire †
To reduce the risk of another financial crisis, the Dodd-Frank Act
requires that trading in certain derivatives be backed by clearinghouses.  Crit-
ics mount two main objections: a clearinghouse shifts risk instead of reduc-
ing it; and a clearinghouse could fail, requiring a bailout.  This Article’s
observation that clearinghouses engage in liquidity partitioning answers
both.  Liquidity partitioning means that when one of its member firms be-
comes bankrupt, a clearinghouse keeps a portion of the firm’s most liquid
assets, and a matching portion of its short-term debt, out of the bankruptcy
estate. The clearinghouse then applies the first toward immediate repayment
of the second.  Economic value is created because creditors within the
clearinghouse are paid much more quickly, and other creditors are paid no
less quickly, than they would be otherwise.  The rapid cash payouts for
clearinghouse members reduce illiquidity and uncertainty in the financial
sector, the main causes of contagion in a crisis.  And because the clearing-
house holds only liquid assets, it avoids the maturity mismatch between
short-term liabilities and long-term assets that characterizes the balance sheets
of many financial institutions.  A clearinghouse therefore is much less likely
than its members to fail during a crisis.  To ensure that clearinghouses re-
main stable and systemically valuable, rulemakers should require clearing of
a wide variety of derivatives contracts, but should limit clearinghouse mem-
bership to dealer firms.
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INTRODUCTION
Bankruptcy misallocates cash during a financial crisis.  When a
firm files for bankruptcy, cash becomes trapped in its bankruptcy es-
tate, often for years. Meanwhile, payments to the firm’s short-term
creditors are delayed.  If those creditors are financial institutions, they
may suffer a liquidity shock that causes them to fail as well, even if they
are fundamentally solvent.  In this way, one firm’s bankruptcy can
spread like a contagion during a crisis.
This Article argues that a financial clearinghouse reduce conta-
gion risk by improving the allocation of cash in a crisis.  A clearing-
house is an organization that serves as a central counterparty for its
members, which are financial institutions that trade regularly among
themselves.  When one member files for bankruptcy, the clearing-
house engages in what this Article calls liquidity partitioning : it cordons
off a portion of the member’s liquid assets and a matching amount of
its short-term debts, and it applies the first toward immediate repay-
ment of the second.  As a result, the clearinghouse’s surviving mem-
bers receive prompt cash payouts instead of delayed bankruptcy
payouts.  And the impact of one firm’s bankruptcy on financial-sector
creditors is determined immediately instead of over the course of
months or years.  In this way, the clearinghouse reduces both illiquid-
ity and uncertainty, two of the main sources of systemic risk.
Mandatory use of clearinghouses was one of the measures that
Congress included in its regulatory response to the recent financial
crisis.  Thus, the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer
Protection Act of 2010 (Dodd-Frank) establishes that certain swaps
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contracts that previously were traded “bilaterally”—directly between
buyers and sellers—will have to be traded through clearinghouses in-
stead.  Critics argue that this clearing mandate does little to reduce
systemic risk because a clearinghouse’s impact on creditor recoveries
is zero-sum: instead of reducing total losses to creditors when an insol-
vent firm fails, a clearinghouse merely shifts losses from some credi-
tors to others.  Critics also argue that a clearinghouse could itself fail
during a crisis, requiring a government bailout.  The clearing man-
date then would seemingly have failed to achieve Dodd-Frank’s pri-
mary goal, which is to replace bailouts with measures that stabilize the
financial sector without putting taxpayer funds at risk.
This Article’s observation that clearinghouses engage in liquidity
partitioning answers both of these objections to the clearing mandate.
While a clearinghouse’s impact on the simple sum of creditor payouts
is zero-sum, its impact on payout speed is not.  When a member fails,
the clearinghouse engages in netting, meaning that it uses short-term
debts owed to the member to immediately repay short-term debts
owed by the member.  As a result, the surviving clearinghouse mem-
bers are paid much more quickly than they would be in bankruptcy.
Meanwhile, the bankrupt member’s outside (non-clearinghouse)
creditors are not paid any less quickly: they still are paid at the end of
the bankruptcy proceeding, which the clearinghouse does nothing to
prolong.  By accelerating cash payouts to some creditors without slow-
ing down payouts to others, the clearinghouse decreases total illiquid-
ity risk in the financial sector.
Liquidity partitioning also makes a clearinghouse much more sta-
ble than its members.  A clearinghouse’s balance sheet is symmetrical
in terms of duration: the clearinghouse accepts responsibility for its
members’ short-term debts only to the extent that the members can
provide the clearinghouse with short-term, liquid assets. By contrast,
many financial institutions—including many clearinghouse mem-
bers—engage in maturity transformation: they raise funds through
short-term loans (including demand deposits) and invest the funds in
long-term, illiquid assets.  As a consequence, these institutions tend to
have low cash ratios—that is, small cash holdings relative to their
short-term debts.  During a crisis, the failure of one such institution
can cause creditors to fear that others are exposed to similar risks and
therefore are about to fail as well.  Creditors may then “run” on finan-
cial institutions generally, withdrawing cash and refusing to renew
short-term loans. Because the institutions typically have more
short-term debt than cash on hand, they may have to seek bankruptcy
protection (or, if banks, enter receivership) even though their under-
lying business activities remain profitable.
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This sort of liquidity shortage is precisely the hazard that a
clearinghouse protects against: it intercepts cash headed toward a
bankruptcy estate and uses it to make immediate payouts to financial
institutions.  Indeed, faster payouts reduce uncertainty about the
clearinghouse members’ financial stability, which decreases the likeli-
hood that their creditors will run in the first place.  At the same time,
liquidity partitioning shields the clearinghouse from the risks associ-
ated with its members’ long-term, illiquid assets, making the clearing-
house much less likely than its members to become either illiquid or
insolvent.  Critics who argue that the clearing mandate will simply
shift bailouts from swaps dealers to clearinghouses in the next crisis
have not recognized that clearinghouses are far less likely to require a
bailout because they avoid the maturity mismatch between assets and
liabilities that characterizes many other financial institutions.
To date, the debate over the clearing mandate has not focused
on how maturity transformation leaves many financial institutions vul-
nerable to liquidity shocks in a crisis. Rather, the emphasis has been
on the question whether clearinghouses can prevent domino-effect in-
solvencies in the financial sector.  Under that theory of systemic risk,
when one financial institution becomes insolvent and defaults on its
debts, its financial-sector creditors suffer losses that can leave them
insolvent and cause them to default as well.  Under this view, spread-
ing insolvency rather than spreading illiquidity is the source of
financial-sector contagion.
There are two problems with a defense of the clearing mandate
based on a theory of financial crises that emphasizes insolvency risk.
The first is the one identified by the clearing mandate’s critics—
namely, that a clearinghouse does not actually reduce total losses to
an insolvent firm’s creditors; it just shifts losses from some creditors to
others.  The second problem is that none of the large, private finan-
cial institutions that received government bailouts during the 2008 cri-
sis actually appears to have been insolvent.  Instead, those institutions
became distressed because uncertainty caused their short-term credi-
tors to run.  Once the crisis passed, these bailout recipients were able
to generate sufficient profits to repay all of their creditors, as well as
the government, with interest.  Illiquidity, not insolvency, had brought
them to the brink of collapse.
One lesson of the recent crisis is that, for a policy measure to be
effective at reducing systemic risk, it must relieve the liquidity pressure
on financial institutions that results from their low cash ratios.  The
bailouts of 2008 increased cash ratios by giving recipients cash in ex-
change for long-term preferred stock.  But the bailouts were politically
unpopular, raising the question whether policymakers can increase
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the financial sector’s cash ratio during a crisis without putting tax-
payer funds on the line.
This Article shows how a clearinghouse can, like a bailout, in-
crease the financial sector’s cash ratio after a financial institution fails.
The clearinghouse achieves this result not by injecting taxpayer funds
into the financial sector but rather by making better use of cash al-
ready in private hands.  Thus, by netting out claims with a failed mem-
ber, the clearinghouse prevents cash from entering the member’s
bankruptcy estate, where it would effectively leave the financial sector.
The clearinghouse then applies that cash toward repayment of short-
term debts owed to other financial institutions.  In this way, the
clearinghouse keeps cash circulating in the financial sector (maintain-
ing the cash ratio’s numerator) while promptly discharging short-term
liabilities (reducing the denominator).
Whether the clearing mandate will realize the systemic benefits of
liquidity partitioning will depend on how it is implemented by
rulemakers.  As noted, these systemic benefits derive from netting,
which is what keeps cash out of a bankruptcy estate and in circulation
in the financial sector.  Clearinghouses make it possible for parties to
engage in a particular type of netting called multiparty netting, which
occurs when the bankrupt firm has a claim against one counterparty
and a debt with another, and the former is used to pay the latter.  A
second type, called multicategory netting, occurs when a bankrupt firm
has debits and credits over different contract types.  Parties do not
need a clearinghouse to engage in multicategory netting, and indeed
a clearinghouse can undermine multicategory netting opportunities if
it fails to accept a variety of contract types for clearing.  For the man-
date to be effective in reducing systemic risk, it must be structured so
that it increases opportunities for multiparty netting more than it
reduces opportunities for multicategory netting.
Part I of this Article describes the traditional functions of clear-
inghouses, which include netting as well as mutualization of losses
among members.  Part II reviews the debate over the clearing man-
date so far, describing the main arguments that have been advanced
for and against the proposition that mandatory use of clearinghouses
can reduce systemic risk.  Part III presents the thesis that a clearing-
house accelerates creditor payouts and thus reduces illiquidity and
uncertainty during a financial crisis.  Part IV considers whether the
systemic benefits of liquidity partitioning could be achieved through
mechanisms other than clearinghouses, for example by amending the
Bankruptcy Code to allow multiparty netting without a central
counterparty.  Finally, Part V considers implications of the Article’s
thesis for lawmakers and regulators.
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I
THE MECHANICS OF CENTRAL CLEARING
A clearinghouse is an organization that serves as a central
counterparty for a group of dealer firms that trade regularly among
themselves.1  The traded articles can be securities, commodities, or
derivatives—that is, financial contracts whose values are based on asset
prices and other market factors.  As an illustration using a simple de-
rivatives contract, imagine that Buyer wishes to purchase a cattle fu-
ture from Seller.  The two could deal with each other directly,
forming a “bilateral” contract.  But if both are members of the
Chicago Mercantile Exchange, they instead will contract through
CME Clearing, the clearinghouse that backs that exchange.2  The
clearinghouse interposes itself between the parties, serving as the
counterparty to each.  Instead of selling the cattle future to Buyer,
Seller sells it to the clearinghouse, which sells an identical future to
Buyer.  In this way, the clearinghouse is, within the circle of its mem-
bers, the “seller to every buyer and the buyer to every seller.”3
Dealer firms organize clearinghouses to redistribute counterparty
risk, which is the risk that one party to a contract will impose losses on
the other by failing to perform.  In the cattle-future example, the con-
tract means that Seller has agreed to deliver cattle on a specified
future date, at which point Buyer has agreed to pay a specified price.
Most futures, however, are cash settled: rather than handling physical
commodities on the maturity date, the parties settle based on the dif-
ference between the contract price and the current market price.4  If
the market price is higher than the contract price, Seller pays Buyer
the difference; if the reverse, Buyer pays Seller.  Without central clear-
ing, each party bears the risk that the other will fail to make the re-
quired settlement payment.  With central clearing, this risk is
transferred to the clearinghouse.
By accepting counterparty risk, the clearinghouse redistributes
the losses that members would otherwise bear individually when a
member becomes insolvent and defaults on its in-house (centrally
cleared) contracts.  This redistribution takes two forms, which can be
1 See Anupam Chander & Randall Costa, Clearing Credit Default Swaps: A Case Study in
Global Legal Convergence, 10 CHI. J. INT’L L. 639, 651–53 (2010).
2 See CHI. MERCANTILE EXCH., AN INTRODUCTION TO FUTURES AND OPTIONS 7 (2006),
available at http://www.cmegroup.com/files/intro_fut_opt.pdf (describing how CME
Clearing backstops futures trading on the Chicago Mercantile Exchange).
3 COMM. ON PAYMENT & SETTLEMENT SYS., TECHNICAL COMM. OF THE INT’L ORG. OF
SEC. COMM’N, RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CENTRAL COUNTERPARTIES 5 (2004), available at
http://www.bis.org/publ/cpss61.pdf.
4 See CHI MERCANTILE EXCHANGE, supra note 2, at 7 (explaining the difference be- R
tween physical delivery and cash settlement, and noting that only about three percent of
futures result in physical delivery).
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called loss externalization and loss mutualization.  Loss externalization re-
fers to how the clearinghouse shifts losses from clearinghouse mem-
bers to the insolvent member’s outside (nonmember) creditors.  And
loss mutualization refers to how the clearinghouse spreads any re-
maining, non-externalized losses among the surviving members.
A. Loss Externalization
Clearinghouses externalize losses primarily by making it possible
for members to engage in multiparty netting.  As a backup measure,
clearinghouses require members to post collateral (typically, securi-
ties) on their contracts, which like netting shifts insolvency risk to
outside creditors.
1. Multiparty Netting
Netting means that when a clearinghouse member fails, the
in-house debts owed to that member are applied toward repayment of
the in-house debts owed by that member.5  In this way, the clearing-
house effectively functions as an agreement in which each member
pledges its in-house claims against other members as security for its
own in-house liabilities.
Netting redistributes insolvency risk.  When an insolvent clearing-
house member defaults on its debts, netting increases total recoveries
for other members by the same amount that it decreases total recov-
eries for the insolvent member’s outside creditors.6  To see why, imag-
ine that Firm A has sold a futures contract to Firm B, which in turn
has sold an identical contract to Firm C.  Imagine further that the
market price of the asset referenced in the contracts (it could be a
commodity such as cattle, a currency, or a financial instrument) has
risen such that if the contracts terminated today, Firm A would owe
Firm B $100, and Firm B would owe Firm C the same amount.  Finally,
imagine that Firm B has other assets worth $200 and other unsecured
liabilities of $300.  Firm B is thus insolvent, and we will assume it files
for bankruptcy.  Per the standard terms of derivatives contracts, Firm
B’s bankruptcy causes both futures to terminate, and each party who
5 Craig Pirrong, The Clearinghouse Cure, REGULATION, Winter 2008–09, at 47 [herein-
after Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure].
6 Craig Pirrong explains the impact of multiparty netting in a derivatives clearing-
house as follows: “[N]etting effectively gives derivatives counterparties a priority claim on
one of the dealer’s assets—its winning derivatives positions.  This priority shifts wealth
from other creditors to these counterparties, and hence is not a social benefit, but a trans-
fer.”  Id.; see also Craig Pirrong, Derivatives Clearing Mandates: Cure or Curse?, J. OF APPLIED
CORP. FIN., Summer 2010, at 50 (“[N]etting effectively changes priorities among creditors;
netting improves the priority of derivatives counterparties in bankruptcy, and lowers the
priority of a bankrupt’s other creditors.”); Mark J. Roe, Clearinghouse Overconfidence, 101
CALIF. L. REV. 1641, 1661–62 (2013) (describing how netting transfers losses from clearing-
house members to non-clearinghouse creditors).
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is “out of the money” must make a termination payment to its respec-
tive counterparty (who is “in the money”).7
Consider first what happens if the contracts among Firms A, B,
and C are bilateral.  Firm A now owes Firm B a $100 termination pay-
ment, and bankruptcy law requires that it be paid into Firm B’s bank-
ruptcy estate.8  Firm B, in turn, owes $100 to Firm C, but bankruptcy’s
automatic stay prevents Firm C from collecting immediately.  Instead,
Firm C must submit a $100 proof of claim to the bankruptcy trustee
and wait to be repaid along with the rest of Firm B’s creditors.  (The
implicit assumption for now is that no collateral has been posted on
the contracts and therefore that Firm C’s claim is unsecured.)  Firm
B’s estate accordingly will have a total of $300 in assets and $400 in
liabilities.  Since all of the liabilities are (by assumption) unsecured,
the trustee will apply the pro rata rule,9 eventually paying each credi-
tor 75 cents on the dollar.  Firm C will receive $75, and Firm B’s re-
maining creditors will receive $225.
Now consider what happens if we assume instead that the con-
tracts among Firms A, B, and C are centrally cleared. (Firm B’s other
debts remain bilateral.)  When Firm B files for bankruptcy, Firm A
does not pay the $100 it owes Firm B into the bankruptcy estate;
rather, it pays that amount to the clearinghouse, which in turn pays
$100 to Firm C.  Firm C therefore recovers $25 more than it recovered
without the clearinghouse.  Meanwhile, the only assets now available
to Firm B’s outside creditors are the $200 in outside assets.  Because
these outside creditors are owed $300, they recover 67 cents on the
dollar, as contrasted with the 75 cents on the dollar (or $225 total)
that they recovered without the clearinghouse.  Relative to bilateral
trading, multiparty netting through the clearinghouse has transferred
$25 from the outside creditors to Firm C, the in-house creditor.
7 The termination payment will typically equal the amount that the in-the-money
party would have to pay to replace the contract at current market prices. See PRACTISING
LAW INST., TERMINATING DERIVATIVE TRANSACTIONS: RISK MITIGATION AND CLOSE-OUT NET-
TING § 5.4 (2010) (stating that, under the most common method for calculating termina-
tion payments, market quotes are used to determine “the cost of preserving for each party
[the] ‘economic equivalent’ of the transaction”).  Some derivatives contracts include
“walkaway” clauses that purport to waive the termination payment when the event of de-
fault is the bankruptcy of the in-the-money party.  Such claims are, however, generally con-
sidered unenforceable.  Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 210(c)(8)(F), 12 U.S.C. § 5390 (2012) (making walkaway clauses unenforceable against
parties placed into receivership pursuant to the FDIC’s “orderly liquidation authority”);
PRACTISING LAW INST., supra at § 5.3; accord In re Lehman Bros. Holdings Inc., 452 B.R. 31,
38–39 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2011) (treating a walkaway-like clause as an ipso facto clause that is
unenforceable in bankruptcy).
8 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (2012) (“[A]n entity that owes a debt that is property of the
estate and that is matured, payable on demand, or payable on order, shall pay such debt to,
or on the order of, the trustee . . . .”).
9 See id. § 726(b) (specifying that unsecured claims of equal rank are paid pro rata).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 9  6-MAY-14 11:35
2014] CLEARINGHOUSES AS LIQUIDITY PARTITIONING 865
FIGURE 1. OPEN THREE-FIRM EXAMPLE, BILATERAL TRADING
Firm A
Firm B
(bankrupt)
Firm C
Owes $100
Owes $100
Other assets: $200
Other liabilities: $300
FIGURE 2. OPEN THREE-FIRM EXAMPLE WITH CLEARINGHOUSE
Firm A
Firm B
(bankrupt)
Firm C
Clearing
-house
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
(Setoff)
Other assets: $200
Other liabilities: $300
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The legal basis for netting is a provision of the Bankruptcy Code
that allows creditors to exercise contractual setoff rights.  As noted
above, when a debtor files for bankruptcy, parties who owe it money
normally must pay their debts into the bankruptcy estate for the bene-
fit of the debtor’s general creditors.10  But an exception applies if the
party who owes money to the debtor is also owed money by the debtor.
In that case, and assuming it has a contractual right to do so, the party
may offset the amount it is owed against the amount it owes, and then
hand over (or, if it is owed more than it owes, put in a claim for) the
difference.11  In this way, a debt owed to the debtor by one of its credi-
tors effectively serves as security for that creditor’s own claim against
the debtor.12  This means that the creditor has a prior claim on one of
the debtor’s assets, namely the debt the creditor itself owes.  If the
debtor is insolvent, this prior claim allows the creditor to recover
more than it would if it had to share that asset on a pro rata basis with
the rest of the debtor’s unsecured creditors.13  And because the divi-
sion of an insolvent debtor’s assets is zero-sum, the larger recovery for
the creditor who sets off necessarily means smaller recoveries for the
rest.
Importantly, the Bankruptcy Code’s allowance for setoffs applies
only to debts that are “mutual,”14 meaning that they run between the
debtor and a single counterparty.15  Consider again the three-firm ex-
ample with bilateral trading, depicted in Figure 1.  When Firm B en-
ters bankruptcy and becomes obligated to pay $100 to Firm C, Firm A
is not permitted to use that debt to cancel its own obligation to pay
$100 into Firm B’s bankruptcy estate.  The party whom the debtor
owes (Firm C) is different than the party who owes the debtor (Firm
A).16
10 Id. § 542(b).
11 Id. §§ 542(b), 553(a).
12 See John C. McCoid II, Setoff: Why Bankruptcy Priority?, 75 VA. L. REV. 15, 32 (1989)
(comparing setoff to a security interest).
13 See In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.)
(describing how setoff increases the recovery of the creditor who sets off).
14 11 U.S.C. § 553(a); Westinghouse Credit Corp. v. D’Urso, 278 F.3d 138, 149 (2d
Cir. 2002) (ruling that the mutuality requirement is satisfied only when debts are “due to
and from the same persons in the same capacity” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)).
15 Another condition is that a party may not set off a claim against the debtor that the
party acquired after the debtor filed for bankruptcy. 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
This condition effectively prevents the mutuality requirement from being satisfied through
post-petition claims trading.
16 See, e.g., In re SemCrude, L.P., 399 B.R. 388, 393–94 (Bankr. D. Del. 2009) (refusing
to enforce a multiparty setoff agreement because “[a]llowing a creditor to offset a debt
it owes to one corporation against funds owed to it by another corporation—even a
wholly-owned subsidiary—would . . . constitute an improper triangular setoff under the
[Bankruptcy] Code.”).
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A clearinghouse makes multiparty netting possible because it
transforms its members into a single counterparty for setoff purposes.
If the claims among Firms A, B, and C are centrally cleared (as de-
picted in Figure 2), then Firm A does not owe $100 to Firm B; rather,
it owes $100 to the clearinghouse, which owes $100 to Firm B.  And
Firm B does not owe Firm C $100; rather, it owes $100 to the clearing-
house, which owes $100 to Firm C.  Therefore, when Firm B enters
bankruptcy, it has a pair of offsetting $100 obligations with a single
counterparty, the clearinghouse.  Because the obligations are now mu-
tual, the Bankruptcy Code permits them to be set off and hence can-
celled.  The debts that remain are Firm A’s $100 debt to the
clearinghouse and the clearinghouse’s $100 debt to Firm C, and the
first can be applied toward repaying the second.  Firm C recovers 100
cents on the dollar, to the detriment of Firm’s B outside creditors.
The higher payout that clearinghouse members obtain through
multiparty netting could also be achieved through traditional forms of
collateral, such as securities.  To see this, consider again the three-firm
example in which Firm A owes Firm B $100, Firm B owes Firm C $100,
and the contracts are bilateral.  To close the loop among the firms, we
will now assume that Firm C also has a bilateral contract with Firm A
on which Firm C owes $100.  (For future reference, this will be the
“closed-circuit” example, as contrasted with the earlier example,
which is “open.”)
FIGURE 3. CLOSED-CIRCUIT EXAMPLE, BILATERAL TRADING
Firm A
Firm B
(bankrupt)
Firm C
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
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To ensure that each party will recover in full in case of default,
Firm A could post a $100 Treasury bond to secure its debt to Firm B,
Firm B could post a $100 Treasury bond to secure its debt to Firm C,
and Firm C could post a $100 Treasury bond as security for Firm A.  In
this way, three $100 bonds would be needed to secure the three con-
tracts.  If we add a clearinghouse, however, the bonds become unnec-
essary.  Firm A no longer needs to post a $100 bond to reassure Firm
B of repayment because Firm B knows that, if Firm A fails, then Firm
A’s contracts will cancel out, and Firm C’s $100 debt to Firm A will
effectively become payable to Firm B instead.  Firm B therefore has no
net exposure, just as was true when Firm A’s $100 obligation to Firm B
was fully secured by a bond.  By the same logic, Firms A and C have no
net exposure either.  Their obligations within the clearinghouse—
which, again, are assets from the perspective of the parties to whom
they are owed—serve as substitute collateral, making it unnecessary
for the firms to tie up capital in Treasury bonds or other securities.
FIGURE 4. CLOSED-CIRCUIT EXAMPLE WITH CLEARINGHOUSE
Firm A
Firm B
(bankrupt)
Firm C
Clearing
-house
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
Owes $100
(Setoff)
(Setoff)(Setoff)
Importantly, the fact that multiparty netting frees up capital does
not mean that it thereby increases recoveries for a failed member’s
outside creditors.  Netting reduces the need for traditional collateral
only to the extent that it prevents outside creditors from recovering
from a different asset—namely, a debt owed to the failed member.
Thus, regardless of whether the clearinghouse members’ priority is
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achieved through netting or collateral, their larger recoveries leave
less value for outside creditors.17
These examples show that netting through clearinghouses does
not increase the sum of creditor recoveries; rather, netting makes it
cheaper for a debtor to privilege some creditors over others.  Without
netting, a debtor’s main option for privileging select creditors is to
pledge safe assets as security, which may require it to tie up capital in
traditional forms of collateral such as Treasury bonds.  But this mech-
anism for granting priority entails two costs: an opportunity cost to the
extent that the assets serving as collateral pay lower risk-adjusted re-
turns than those the debtor could obtain elsewhere; and the transac-
tion costs of posting the collateral.  By reducing the need for
traditional collateral, netting avoids these costs.18  Netting is secured
lending on the cheap.
Because it reduces the cost of privileging some creditors over
others, netting might seem to be socially efficient—that is, it might
seem to increase total wealth.  But netting has other consequences
that must be considered.  Since netting redistributes wealth when a
debtor is insolvent, efforts to promote it could fairly be described as a
type of rent-seeking.  And, per standard economic theory,
rent-seeking reduces total social wealth to the extent that seekers ex-
pend resources trying to exact a wealth transfer and would-be losers
expend resources trying to block it.19  By making rent-seeking cheaper
for the seekers, netting might produce a comparatively larger increase
in defensive spending by the would-be losers, leading to a net loss of
social wealth.  Thus, to conclude that netting is socially efficient, we
need a reason to think that it does more than just make it easier for a
debtor to favor some creditors over others.
17 As an illustration, consider the perspective of the outside creditors of Firm B.  In
the case without the clearinghouse (shown in Figure 3), Firm B posts a $100 Treasury bond
to assure Firm C of a full recovery.  That bond will be unavailable to Firm B’s outside
creditors if Firm B fails because then Firm C will seize the bond and apply it in satisfaction
of its $100 claim against Firm B.  On the other hand, what is available to Firm B’s outside
creditors is the $100 debt owed to Firm B by Firm A, a debt that is fully secured by a
different Treasury bond.  Therefore, Firm B’s transactions with Firms A and C have no net
effect on the recoveries of Firm B’s outside creditors.  If instead we have a clearinghouse
(Figure 4), the $100 in capital that otherwise would be tied up in a Treasury bond pledged
to Firm C will now presumably be held in another form in Firm B’s estate.  But the $100
owed by Firm A will no longer be available to Firm B’s outside creditors if Firm B fails, as
this will be set off against Firm B’s $100 debt to Firm C.  So, again, the effect on Firm B’s
outside creditors of Firm B’s transactions with Firms A and C is a wash.
18 See Craig Pirrong, The Economics of Clearing in Derivatives Markets: Netting, Asymmetric
Information, and the Sharing of Default Risks Through a Central Counterparty 26 (Jan. 8, 2009)
(Working Paper) [hereinafter Pirrong, Economics of Clearing], available at http://papers.
ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1340660.
19 See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 45 n.4 (8th ed. 2011).
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2. Margin Collection
In each of the three-firm examples discussed so far, the clearing-
house member that fails has had a “matched” book, meaning that its
in-house claims against other members exactly equal its in-house
debts.  Although clearinghouse members normally prefer to maintain
matched books, occasional imbalances due to price fluctuations and
other factors are unavoidable.  Therefore, as a second line of defense
against losses, clearinghouses require members to post collateral, or
“margin,” on their in-house contracts.20  Margin typically consists of
high-grade securities that, under normal market conditions, can
quickly be sold for cash.21
To see how margin collection works, consider again the example
in which Seller sells a cattle future to Buyer and the trade is cleared by
the clearinghouse backing the Chicago Mercantile Exchange.  To pro-
tect itself against counterparty risk, the clearinghouse may require
both Seller and Buyer to post “initial” margin when they enter into
their contract.22  Subsequently, the market price of cattle may rise
above the contract price, pushing Seller “out of the money” and ex-
posing the clearinghouse to the risk that Seller will fail and the
clearinghouse will have to step in and fulfill the obligation to Buyer.
If this exposure exceeds the value of Seller’s initial margin and is not
offset by Seller’s other in-house positions, the clearinghouse will re-
quire Seller to post additional, “variation” margin.23  Conversely, if the
market price of cattle falls back to the contract price, Seller may be
allowed to take back some of its collateral, as the risk to the clearing-
house will have abated.  If the price falls further, Buyer may then have
to post variation margin.
Clearinghouse positions are typically “marked to market” in this
way at least daily, subjecting members to margin calls that they must
satisfy to continue trading.24  If a member cannot make a margin call,
its in-house contracts immediately terminate.25  The clearinghouse
then nets out the member’s in-house positions and liquidates posted
collateral to the extent of any shortfall.26
20 See CME GRP., CME CLEARING FINANCIAL SAFEGUARDS 7 (2012), available at http://
www.cmegroup.com/clearing/files/financialsafeguards.pdf.
21 Id. at 9 (describing acceptable collateral as including cash, U.S. Treasury bonds,
foreign sovereign debt instruments, and stocks).
22 See Sean J. Griffith, Governing Systemic Risk: Towards a Governance Structure for Deriva-
tives Clearinghouses, 61 EMORY L.J. 1153, 1182 (2012).
23 See id.
24 CRAIG PIRRONG, THE INEFFICIENCY OF CLEARING MANDATES, POLICY ANALYSIS 9 (2010)
[hereinafter PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY].
25 See CME GRP., supra note 20, at 15–18. R
26 See id.
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Because a party to a contract enjoys the first claim to collateral
posted by its counterparty, margin collection is, like netting, a mecha-
nism by which a clearinghouse achieves loss externalization on behalf
of members.  But it is a more expensive mechanism given the oppor-
tunity costs and administrative inconvenience of holding and posting
traditional collateral, which is one reason why members generally try
to maintain matched books.  It also is important to note that a central
counterparty is not needed for margin collection (as it is for mul-
tiparty netting): bilateral contracts can be (and usually are) secured by
traditional collateral as well.  Clearinghouse members delegate collat-
eral collection to the clearinghouse not from legal necessity but be-
cause the clearinghouse is in the best position to calculate each
member’s liability to the other members after multiparty netting is
taken into account.
B. Loss Mutualization (for Members and Customers)
If netting and posted collateral together prove inadequate to
cover a failed firm’s in-house debts, the clearinghouse turns to its last
line of defense against losses: its guaranty fund. Each member must
make a large contribution to the guaranty fund upon joining the
clearinghouse.27  When the fund is tapped, the clearinghouse draws
first from the failed member’s account and then pro rata from the
accounts of the remaining members,28 who must promptly replenish
them.29
By drawing on the guaranty fund, the clearinghouse mutualizes
among surviving members any losses that were not externalized
through netting and margin collection.  Thus, to the extent of the
fund’s value, the members collectively guarantee their residual
in-house debts.  Why would trading firms want to guarantee each
other’s contracts in this way?  One possibility is that loss externaliza-
tion is highly valuable to members, who therefore may want to ensure
that the clearinghouse will be able to continue operating even if a
member with large out-of-the-money positions fails.  A second answer
applies when the clearinghouse backs a securities or commodities
27 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed.
Reg. 74,284, 74,293 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) (indicating that
CME and IntercontinentalExchange (ICE) Clear Credit, both of which clear credit default
swaps, require each of their members to contribute at least $50 million to their respective
guaranty funds).  At LCH.Clearnet, the reserve fund is called the “clearing fund.”
LCH.CLEARNET, LCH.CLEARNET: A GENERAL INTRODUCTION TO RISK MITIGATION 10.
28 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed.
Reg. at 74,322 (describing the order in which clearinghouses draw upon fund sources in
case of a member’s default).
29 Members may also have to make new contributions if the assets in the guaranty
fund lose value. CME GRP., supra note 20, at 9 (describing how new members are subject R
to potential contribution requirements at least monthly).
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exchange, as many do.30  In that setting, a system of mutual guaran-
tees allows trades to be executed automatically at the best offered
price regardless of the creditworthiness of the member making the
offer.31  And the requirement that members contribute to the guar-
anty fund prevents them from free riding on the system of mutual
guarantees, as otherwise they might not maintain liquidity reserves
large enough to enable them to honor their obligations as guarantors.
In addition to trading on their own accounts, clearinghouse
members—most of which are investment banks and brokerages—typi-
cally execute trades on behalf of customers.32  And members collec-
tively guarantee these customer contracts as well in order to protect
customers from the credit risk of individual members.33  Consider
again the example in which Seller sells a cattle future to Buyer, but
assume now that Seller sells the future on behalf of a customer, a
rancher who wants to hedge against the risk of a drop in cattle prices.
Assume further that the price of cattle falls—yielding a gain for the
rancher on the contract—but Seller fails before paying the rancher
what he is owed.  Without the clearinghouse, the rancher might have
to submit a proof of claim to Seller’s bankruptcy proceeding.  The
resulting delay, and likely reduction, in the rancher’s payout would
undermine the future’s value as a hedging device.34  But because
Seller is a clearinghouse member, the clearinghouse assumes respon-
sibility for all of its customer contracts when it fails and hence will pay
the rancher the full amount of his claim.35  Or, if the contract has not
yet expired, the clearinghouse will arrange for a different member to
act as the rancher’s broker.  In these ways, the clearinghouse builds
public confidence in trading markets, to the common benefit of the
dealer firms that serve as market intermediaries.
II
THE DEBATE OVER MANDATORY CLEARING
Before the 2008 financial crisis, the choice whether to use a cen-
tral counterparty was mostly left to dealer firms and to the exchanges
30 See Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 45 (“The Minneapolis Grain Ex- R
change established the first modern clearinghouse for futures in 1891, and other futures
exchanges in the United States adopted clearing in the years between 1891 and 1925.”).
31 Id. at 46; accord Nathan Goralnik, Bankruptcy-Proof Finance and the Supply of Liquidity,
122 YALE L.J. 460, 503 (2012) (arguing that a swaps clearinghouses can make markets more
“liquid”—meaning that would-be sellers can more easily find buyers, and vice-versa—by
allowing market participants to disregard counterparty default risk).
32 Pirrong, Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 15–16. R
33 PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 9 (“[Clearinghouse] members effectively R
insure the customers against default.”).
34 See Pirrong, Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 57. R
35 Id. at 17; accord CME GRP., supra note 20, at 15 (describing how customer accounts R
are handled upon a member’s default).
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they organized.  This state of affairs changed in 2010 with the enact-
ment of Dodd-Frank and its clearing mandate for swaps contracts.
Legislative history explains the mandate as a response to the bailouts
of two major players in the market for credit default swaps: Bear
Stearns and AIG.  Federal officials feared that bankruptcy filings by
these firms would destabilize the broader financial system.  But the
use of taxpayer funds to keep the firms afloat was politically unpopu-
lar, leading Congress to enact a statute that aims to protect the finan-
cial system by other means.36 Whether clearinghouses can in fact
stabilize the financial system has been the subject of a broad scholarly
debate, with skeptics raising concerns that cast serious doubt on the
arguments advanced so far by the clearing mandate’s advocates.
A. From Bailouts to Mandate
Although the first financial clearinghouses backstopped trading
in commodities futures,37 clearinghouses are now used in the trading
of more complex derivatives as well.38  An example is SwapClear,
which backs over fifty percent of the trading in interest rate swaps.39
During  the 2008 financial crisis, however, trading in one important
type of derivative remained entirely bilateral: the credit default
swap.40  That type of swap provides protection against the risk that a
debt security will default.41  Under the contract, the protection buyer
agrees to make quarterly payments, analogous to insurance premi-
ums, to the counterparty, the protection seller.42  The seller agrees in
return that if one of the debt securities named in the contract de-
faults, the seller will pay the buyer the difference between the secur-
ity’s face value and its post-default value.43  While credit default swaps
were originally developed to protect against default risk on corporate
36 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 1 (2010) (stating that Dodd-Frank’s goals are to improve
accountability and transparency in the financial sector and to protect the American
taxpayer).
37 See Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 45. R
38 Id. at 45–46.
39 See LCH.CLEARNET, http://www.lchclearnet.com/swaps/swapclear_for_clearing_
members/ (last visited Mar. 2, 2014).  In an interest rate swap, one party makes periodic
payments based on a fixed interest rate, and the counterparty makes return payments
based on a variable interest rate, such as LIBOR.  The swap is cash-settled each period
based on the rate difference.  John D. Finnerty & Kishlaya Pathak, A Review of Recent Deriva-
tives Litigation, 16 FORDHAM J. CORP. & FIN. L. 73, 82 (2011).
40 See Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 640. R
41 Id. at 649, 668.
42 Houman B. Shadab, Guilty By Association? Regulating Credit Default Swaps, 4
ENTREPRENEURIAL BUS. L.J. 407, 431 (2010).  The analogy between credit default swaps and
insurance is imperfect because the protection buyer need not own the debt instruments
referenced in the contract. See M. Todd Henderson, Credit Derivatives Are Not “Insurance,”
16 CONN. INS. L.J. 1, 18–19 (2009).
43 This describes a cash-settled credit default swap.  Another settlement option is
physical delivery, whereby the protection buyer gives the defaulted debt security to the
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bonds, by 2008 there also were large markets for credit default swaps
referencing government bonds and mortgage-backed securities.44
At the beginning of 2008, several large Wall Street firms served as
dealers in credit default swaps, matching buyers with sellers and often
serving as the counterparties to each.45  Among the most active deal-
ers was the investment bank Bear Stearns.46  Credit markets lost confi-
dence in Bear after it announced deep losses on investments in
mortgage-backed securities,47 and it was on the verge of filing for
bankruptcy when it was purchased by JPMorgan Chase in March
2008.48  The Federal Reserve (Fed) encouraged the sale by agreeing
to accept the risk that some of Bear’s mortgage-linked investments
would continue to lose value.49  In exchange for this federal assis-
tance, JPMorgan agreed to assume responsibility for all of Bear’s de-
rivatives counterparties and customers.50
Even though Bear had more than a trillion dollars in open swap
positions when it was sold to JPMorgan,51 it had generally maintained
a matched derivatives book and therefore had little net exposure on
these contracts.52  Bad mortgage investments, not credit default swaps,
were the reason that Bear lost access to private credit.  But credit de-
fault swaps were the reason that federal officials considered the invest-
ment bank “too big to fail.”  In April 2008, Fed Chairman Ben
protection seller in exchange for a payment equal to the security’s face value. See  Shadab,
supra note 42, at 432. R
44 See Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 639 n.1. R
45 See Shadab, supra note 42, at 432–34 (describing participants in the market for R
credit default swaps before the 2008 crisis).
46 See Rene´ M. Stulz, Credit Default Swaps and the Credit Crisis, 24 J. ECON. PERSP. 73, 82
(2010) (stating that the notional value of Bear’s credit default swap positions was $2.25
trillion).
47 Bear Stearns Reports First-Ever Quarterly Loss, DEALBOOK (Dec. 20, 2007, 8:19 AM),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2007/12/20/bear-reports-steep-but-expected-4th-quarter-
loss/ (describing heavy investments by two internal Bear hedge funds in home mortgages).
48 The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., 110th Cong. (2008) (state-
ment of Ben S. Bernanke, Chairman, Fed. Res. Sys.), http://www.jec.senate.gov/public/?a
=Files.Serve&File_id=9991d366-42be-40c8-be88-15745c8089c5 (stating that on March 13,
2008, Bear advised government officials that it would have to file for protection under
Chapter 11 the next day); David Ellis & Tami Luhby, JPMorgan Scoops up Troubled Bear,
CNNMONEY (Mar. 17, 2008, 3:07 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/03/16/news/
companies/jpmorgan_bear_stearns/ (describing how JPMorgan acquired Bear after Bear
suffered a “classic” run on the bank).
49 The Fed lent $29 billion to a special purpose entity that used these funds plus $1
billion lent by JP Morgan to buy a pool of risky Bear Stearns assets.  If the assets had proven
to be worth less than their purchase price, the losses after the first billion would have been
borne by the Federal Reserve.  In fact, the assets appreciated, and within five years the
entity had fully repaid the principal on the Federal Reserve loan plus $765 million in inter-
est. See Maiden Lane Transactions, FED. RESERVE BANK OF N.Y., http://www.newyorkfed.org/
markets/maidenlane.html (last visited Mar. 3, 2014).
50 Bear Sterns: No Picnic, ECONOMIST, Mar. 29, 2008, at 95.
51 See Stulz, supra note 46, at 82. R
52 Id. at 83.
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Bernanke told Congress that Fed officials had feared that Bear’s bank-
ruptcy would bring about a “chaotic unwinding of positions” that
would imperil the firm’s “thousands of counterparties.”53  This con-
cern for counterparties explains why the Fed insisted that JPMorgan
assume responsibility for all of Bear’s derivatives positions and
customers.
Two months after it helped save Bear Stearns, the Fed began ad-
vocating that trading in credit default swaps be moved onto clearing-
houses.54  Before these efforts could bear fruit, however, another
major player in credit default swaps—insurance giant AIG—ran out of
cash and came to the brink of bankruptcy.  AIG had acted mostly as a
protection seller rather than as a dealer, and in the years leading up
to the crisis was the biggest seller of default protection on debt securi-
ties backed by subprime mortgages.55  During that period, AIG en-
joyed a triple-A credit rating, which induced protection buyers to
excuse it from posting initial margin on its contracts.56  When, how-
ever, both AIG and the securities referenced in its swaps suffered rat-
ings downgrades, the protection buyers made large collateral calls.57
AIG could not satisfy them, primarily because it had used much of its
working capital to buy mortgage-backed securities, the market for
which was distressed due to a sustained drop in house prices.58  To
keep AIG afloat, the Fed extended an $85 billion line of credit in
September 2008;59 subsequent bailout measures increased the govern-
ment’s total commitment to AIG and its swaps counterparties to $182
billion.60
The bailouts of Bear Stearns, AIG, and other big financial institu-
tions offended Americans all along the political spectrum.61
53 The Economic Outlook: Hearing Before the Joint Econ. Comm., supra note 48; Simon R
Boughey, After Bear Stearns Scare, Fed Pushes Banks to Form Central Clearing House for CDS
Market, EUROWEEK, June 13, 2008, at 64; Yalman Onaran, Fed Aided Bear Stearns as Firm Faced
Chapter 11, Bernanke Says, BLOOMBERG (Apr. 2, 2008, 1:20 PM), http://www.bloomberg.
com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=a7coicThgaEE.
54 Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 663. R
55 See Richard Squire, Shareholder Opportunism in a World of Risky Debt, 123 HARV. L.
REV. 1151, 1184–85 (2010).
56 Id. at 1184.
57 Id. at 1187.
58 See James Bullard et al., Systemic Risk and the Financial Crisis: A Primer, FED. RES. BANK
OF ST. LOUIS REV., Sept.–Oct. 2009, at 403 (describing the drop in house prices and rise in
foreclosures through 2008).
59 Tami Luhby, Fed in AIG Rescue—$85B Loan, CNNMONEY (Sept. 17, 2008, 10:21
AM), http://money.cnn.com/2008/09/16/news/companies/AIG/.
60 Michal Darila, US Treasury Makes Billions on AIG’s Bailout, WBP ONLINE (Sept. 11,
2012, 5:41 AM), http://wbponline.com/Articles/View/8011.
61 The AIG bailout was “heavily criticized from both the left and the right.” Id.; see also
Mary Williams Walsh, A.I.G. Lists Firms to Which It Paid Taxpayer Money, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 16,
2009, at A1, A14 (“[T]axpayers may have a hard time accepting that so many marquee
financial companies—including some American banks that received separate government
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Unsurprisingly, Congress’s main regulatory response to the crisis—the
Dodd-Frank Act—contains several provisions that purportedly make
bailouts obsolete.  One such provision is the clearing mandate, which
directs the Commodities Futures Trading Commission (CFTC) and
Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to designate categories of
swaps for required central clearing.62  Dodd-Frank’s Senate Report
quotes Chairman Bernanke for the proposition that “[m]aking deriva-
tives safer is a very important part of solving too-big-to-fail.”63  The
report further asserts that the bilateral swaps issued by Bear and AIG
were unsafe because they were not backed by adequate collateral.64
Clearinghouses are to prevent similar problems in the future by en-
forcing strict margin requirements, which according to the report are
“[t]he main tool for regulating contagion and systemic risk.”65  To en-
sure that margin requirements are sufficiently stringent, Dodd-Frank
directs the Fed to issue clearinghouse “risk management standards,”66
and it empowers the SEC and CFTC to translate them into binding
rules.67  Credit default swaps are surely the primary target, but the
mandate’s definition of “swap” is much broader, as it also encom-
passes interest rate swaps, currency swaps, debt and equity swaps, and
commodity swaps of various types.68
Although legislative history emphasizes the supposed role of
under-collateralization in the 2008 crisis, the clearing mandate’s aca-
demic proponents have not staked their case on that historical claim.
Their reticence is understandable, as the notion that inadequate col-
lateral justifies the clearing mandate is subject to criticism on several
help and others based overseas—benefit[ted] from government money.”).  In addition,
the Troubled Asset Relief Program (TARP), under which the Treasury Department could
spend up to $700 billion to rescue the financial system, was, in the words of one journalist,
as “unpopular as a screaming toddler.”  Steve Chiotakis, How Did TARP Become So Unpopu-
lar?, MARKETPLACE (Oct. 1, 2010, 9:15 AM), http://www.marketplace.org/topics/business/
follow-money/how-did-tarp-become-so-unpopular.  Even the Treasury’s website admits that
“TARP remains deeply unpopular—for understandable reasons.” See About Financial Stabil-
ity: Facts About TARP, OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY (July 13, 2012),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/about/pages/plan.aspx.
62 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 723(a)(2), 7
U.S.C. § 2 (2012); § 763(a), 17 U.S.C. § 78c-3 (2012).  An exemption for end-users applies
to swaps used by non-financial firms “to hedge or mitigate commercial risk.” Id.
§ 723(a)(2).
63 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29 (2010).
64 The report theorizes that AIG “would have had less incentive to enter into such
large positions” if “market participants or regulators [had] demanded more capital.” Id. at
30.  Turning to Bear Stearns, the report argues that under-capitalization caused systemic
risk by enabling the firm to use derivatives in order to “hide leverage.” Id.
65 Id. at 33.  A Wall Street Journal editorial is quoted for the proposition that “[p]utting
nearly all derivatives through clearinghouses, with tough margin rules, could do away with
most of the under-collateralization.” Id. at 31.
66 Dodd-Frank Act § 805(a)(1), 12 U.S.C. § 5464(a)(1) (2012).
67 Id. § 805(a)(2)(A).
68 Id. § 721(a)(47)(A).
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grounds, the most obvious being that regulators do not need a
central counterparty in order to set collateral levels.  Indeed, while
Dodd-Frank exempts some types of swaps from the clearing mandate,
it still subjects them to collateralization rules enforced directly by reg-
ulatory agencies.69  Uncleared swaps are also subject to reporting re-
quirements,70 calling into question the importance of clearinghouses
as information-gathering mechanisms, another potential benefit of
the mandate that the Senate report mentions.71  It is possible that
compliance with strict margin rules is easier to verify if contracts are
channeled through a clearinghouse, but the report does not claim
such a benefit for central clearing or estimate its magnitude.  Another
objection to the margin-collection rationale for the clearing mandate
is that collateral can become unreliable in a financial crisis, a problem
discussed in Part IV.
Instead of margin collection, the mandate’s academic propo-
nents have focused on the two other clearinghouse functions de-
scribed in Part I: multiparty netting and loss mutualization.  In
emphasizing these traditional clearinghouse functions, however, the
proponents have needed a theory to explain why trading in credit de-
fault swaps remained bilateral even after trading in most other finan-
cial derivatives had moved to clearinghouses.  If multiparty netting
and loss mutualization provide benefits to users of credit default swaps
that exceed their costs, then central clearing of those swaps should
have come about by private initiative.  Why, then, was a government
directive necessary?72
One possible answer, now being tested in the courts, is that trad-
ing in credit default swaps was dominated by a few large dealers who
69 See id. § 731; § 764(a).
70 Id. § 731.
71 S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 33–35 (2010).  The idea is that clearinghouses, by sitting at
the intersection of trading activity, can encourage competitive trading by collecting and
publishing data on market prices and trading volumes. See, e.g., Jeremy C. Kress, Credit
Default Swaps, Clearinghouses, and Systemic Risk: Why Centralized Counterparties Must Have Access
to Central Bank Liquidity, 48 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 49, 69 (2011) (“A [clearinghouse] could
improve transparency in . . . derivative markets by, for instance, publishing pricing and
volume information.”).  Information gathering is not, however, a benefit of central clear-
ing per se, as the same result can be achieved if market participants register with an
over-the-counter data hub that aggregates and publishes trading information. See Pirrong,
Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 62.  Before the 2008 crisis, the Depository Trust and R
Clearing Corporation’s Trade Information Warehouse served this function in the market
for credit default swaps. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-09-397T, SYSTEMIC RISK:
REGULATORY OVERSIGHT AND RECENT INITIATIVES TO ADDRESS RISK POSED BY CREDIT DEFAULT
SWAPS 20 (2009), available at http://www.gao.gov/assets/130/121774.pdf.  While participa-
tion in that data hub is voluntary, id., Congress could require it by statute, thereby accom-
plishing the same information-gathering benefit the Senate report attributes to mandatory
clearing.
72 See PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 2 (arguing that mandatory clearing can R
be justified only by market failure).
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resisted central clearing as a threat to their oligopolistic profits.73
Rather, however, than treating clearinghouses as devices for promot-
ing competition, both the Senate report and the clearing mandate’s
academic proponents have argued that central clearing can reduce
systemic risk, meaning the risk of a crisis that sees the nearly simulta-
neous failures of numerous financial institutions.74  As a historical
matter, systemic failures (within the financial system) often precede
deep systematic downturns (in the general economy), suggesting that
systemic risk entails large negative externalities.75  For this reason,
many academic commentators, including this one, believe that finan-
cial institutions lack sufficient incentives to reduce systemic risk on
their own, making some amount of government regulation desira-
ble.76  Meanwhile, scholars such as Craig Pirrong and Mark Roe
have argued that, regardless of whether systemic risk justifies
financial-sector regulation as a general matter, mandatory swaps clear-
ing is just as likely to increase systemic risk as reduce it.77 To set a
73 The lawsuits allege a conspiracy among swaps dealers to maintain inflated profits by
reducing price transparency and creating barriers to entry. See Andrew Harris, MF Global
Unit Sues 11 Banks over CDS Market, BLOOMBERG (July 30, 2013, 1:04 PM), http://www.
bloomberg.com/news/2013-07-30/mf-global-unit-sues-11-banks-over-cds-market.html; see
also Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg.
74,284, 74,298 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50) (noting commentary
from Citadel, a hedge fund, arguing that central clearing of credit default swaps “will re-
move a significant barrier to entry for alternative swap market liquidity providers and will
enable smaller entities to compete on more equal terms”).
74 See, e.g., Franklin R. Edwards & Edward R. Morrison, Derivatives and the Bankruptcy
Code: Why the Special Treatment?, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 91, 91 (2005) (defining systemic risk as
“the risk that multiple major financial market participants will fail at the same time”);
George G. Kaufman & Kenneth E. Scott, What Is Systemic Risk, and Do Bank Regulators Retard
or Contribute to It?, 7 INDEP. REV. 371 (2003) (“[S]ystemic risk in banking is evidenced by
high correlation and clustering of bank failures . . . .”).
75 CARMEN M. REINHART & KENNETH S. ROGOFF, THIS TIME IS DIFFERENT: EIGHT CENTU-
RIES OF FINANCIAL FOLLY 165 (2009) (showing that banking crises are associated with sharp
reductions in economic output); Kathryn Judge, Fragmentation Nodes: A Study in Financial
Innovation, Complexity, and Systemic Risk, 64 STAN. L. REV. 657, 663 (2012) (“It has long been
recognized that a failure in the functioning of the financial system imposes significant
externalities, adversely affecting persons far removed from the financial institutions at the
core of the crisis.”).
76 Judge Richard Posner states the argument as follows:
It is because the banking industry is inherently risky that it can collapse
without careful macroeconomic management by government, and it is be-
cause it is critical to a modern economy that if it does collapse, it can bring
the rest of the economy down with it, as September 2008 proved.
RICHARD A. POSNER, THE CRISIS OF CAPITALIST DEMOCRACY 251 (2010); accord Judge, supra
note 75, at 663 (“The long and deep recession that arose out of the 2007–2009 financial R
crisis served as a powerful reminder of these externalities and hence of the value of regula-
tions that reduce systemic risk.”).
77 Pirrong, Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 54 (“[T]here are many channels by
which formation of a [clearinghouse] affects systemic risk, and some of these tend to in-
crease systemic risk.”); Mark Roe, Systemic Costs of Derivatives’ Priorities, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539,
586-87 (2011) (describing ways a clearinghouse may increase systemic risk).
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foundation for this debate, the next subpart reviews the main theories
of systemic risk, illustrated through examples from the 2008 crisis.
B. Sources of Systemic Risk
The tendency for financial institutions to collapse in rapid succes-
sion during crises implies that their solvency levels tend to be tightly
correlated.  Scholars have identified two reasons this might be the
case.  The first is the financial sector’s particular vulnerability to the
bursting of asset bubbles, especially those involving housing.78  Bank-
ing crises in developed economies often follow steep drops in real-
estate prices, a connection that makes sense given banks’ central role
in mortgage lending.79  When systemic risk results from parallel in-
vestments by financial institutions in overpriced assets, those institu-
tions’ failures are correlated in time but do not cause each other;
rather, they result from a common shock—the collapse in asset values.
A second theory of correlated solvency levels in the financial sec-
tor is based on the observation that financial institutions are often
among each other’s largest creditors.80  Such interconnections mean
that one financial institution’s insolvency could set off a domino effect
by imposing losses on other financial institutions that leave them in-
solvent as well.81  In this way, interconnections among financial insti-
tutions are imagined to be a source of “contagion,” whereby one
firm’s failure directly causes others rather than merely correlating
with them in time.82
While common or overlapping investments may suggest why the
financial sector is prone to multi-firm failures, they do not explain the
other distinctive feature of a financial crisis, which is its suddenness.
In, for example, a declining industry—in which we would expect sev-
eral competitors to fail—bankruptcies are often staggered over several
years.  In a financial crisis, by contrast, groups of financial institutions
often come to the brink within days of each other.  To explain the
suddenness of financial crises, another characteristic of financial insti-
tutions must be noticed, which is their heavy reliance on short-term
78 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 74, at 372, 381; see also Judge, supra note 75, at 693 R
(“Financial crises are often preceded by a bubble in which one or more classes of assets are
traded at prices far in excess of their fundamental values.”).
79 See REINHART & ROGOFF, supra note 75, at 142. R
80 See Kathryn Judge, InterBank Discipline, 60 UCLA L. REV. 1262, 1281–83 (2013)
(describing how large fractions of the loan portfolios of major investment banks consist of
credit extended to other financial institutions); Kaufman & Scott, supra note 74, at 372 R
(describing “chain reaction” credit failures).
81 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 74, at 373; see also Edwards & Morrison, supra note 74, R
at 101 (describing critically a theory whereby systemic risk results from “a chain reaction of
insolvencies”).
82 See Roe, supra note 6, at 1653 (describing “contagion risk” as resulting from R
financial-sector interconnections).
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credit.  This reliance means that financial institutions can fail quickly
for lack of cash if their short-term creditors suddenly stop lending.
The financial sector relies heavily on short-term credit because
one of its main economic functions is to provide maturity transforma-
tion: to channel funds from short-term lenders to long-term borrow-
ers.83  Thus, many households and firms have cash that they are
willing to lend only on the condition that they can get it back
promptly if desired.  At the same time, many households and firms
also want to borrow cash that they will not have to pay back right away.
The financial sector serves the economy by borrowing from the first
group and lending to the second.84  Maturity transformation is most
evident in the traditional banking sector, which accepts “demand” de-
posits (which the depositor can withdraw at any time) and, to turn a
profit, invests the proceeds in long-term assets such as mortgages.
An important consequence of maturity transformation is that
banks must operate with low cash ratios: small cash holdings relative to
their short-term liabilities.85  A low cash ratio is not a problem as long
as new deposits roughly equal withdrawals over any given period.  If,
however, many depositors suddenly suspect that the bank is headed
for failure, they may run on it, trying to withdraw their money at the
same time.  Because most of the bank’s cash will be tied up in long-
term assets, it may be unable to repay all of the run’s participants and
therefore may have to shut its doors.86  The logic of a run is that, once
a bank appears doomed, its depositors would rather receive a full pay-
out immediately than take the risk of a partial, delayed payout after
the bank enters bankruptcy or receivership.
Runs are especially pernicious because they can shutter a bank or
other financial institution even if it is solvent, meaning that its operat-
ing profits would have been sufficient to repay all of its debt if a large
portion of that debt had not come due more quickly than expected.87
In other words, the entity fails not because it had too much debt, but
because there was a mismatch between when its assets produced cash
and when its debts became payable.  To be sure, a financial institution
83 See RICHARD SCOTT CARNELL, JONATHAN R. MACEY & GEOFFREY P. MILLER, THE LAW
OF FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS 40 (5th ed. 2013) (“A financial intermediary can invest in a
portfolio of illiquid assets and then offer investors liquid claims on its own assets.”).
84 Id. (“This conversion of illiquid investments into liquid ones yields significant bene-
fits for investors.”).
85 See RICHARD A. BREALEY & STEWART C. MYERS, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE FINANCE
827 (6th ed. 2000) (defining “cash ratio”).
86 POSNER, supra note 76, at 43; Judge, supra note 75, at 664. R
87 See Douglas W. Diamond & Phillip H. Dybvig, Bank Runs, Deposit Insurance, and
Liquidity, 91 J. POL. ECON. 401, 402 (1983) (describing how even a solvent bank can be
shuttered by a run); Steven L. Schwarcz, Systemic Risk, 97 GEO. L.J. 193, 199 (2008) (noting
how bank runs during the Great Depression “caused many otherwise solvent banks to
default”).
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that is being run upon can try to sell its long-term assets to raise cash
quickly.  But buyers may be hard to find on short notice, forcing the
institution to sell at “fire sale” prices that reflect a deep discount to the
assets’ fundamental value.88  As a result, the sales proceeds may be
insufficient to repay creditors while leaving enough cash to cover daily
operations.  Notably, a solvent financial institution could not be bro-
ken by a run if it could use assets other than cash to repay creditors.
Therefore, the institution’s failure is ultimately due to a lack of liquid-
ity, even if the initial cause was a loss of creditor confidence.
Why would creditors lose confidence in a solvent financial institu-
tion?  One scenario is that one financial institution’s collapse causes
creditors to fear, accurately or otherwise, that others invested heavily
in the same overpriced assets or lent heavily to the institution that
failed. In this way, fears relating to the first two sources of systemic risk
(sector-wide investments in overpriced assets, and domino-effect insol-
vencies) contribute to the third source (illiquidity).  Moreover, once a
run is underway, creditors have an incentive to participate regardless
of what they think about the institution’s fundamental solvency, be-
cause they know that, at a minimum, they will temporarily lose access
to their money when the institution fails.89
The tendency for creditors to lose confidence even in solvent fi-
nancial institutions demonstrates the role of uncertainty in systemic
risk.90  Uncertainty can be understood as an aspect of the illiquidity
factor, as a firm with sufficient cash need not fear a temporary loss of
creditor confidence.91  The combination of illiquidity and uncertainty
in a financial crisis is, like interconnectedness, a mechanism of conta-
gion, because the failure of one financial institution can trigger runs
that quickly bring down others.92
88 Schwarcz, supra note 87, at 214.  For a self-liquidating asset such as a security or R
mortgage, the fundamental value is the discounted present value of the cash flows that the
asset is expected to generate.  This is the price that the asset should fetch if sold under
normal market conditions.
89 Diamond & Dybvig, supra note 87, at  401–02. R
90 See Judge, supra note 75, at 696–97 (describing how “[l]ack of information” contrib- R
utes to systemic risk by making investors more cautious after “underappreciated risks”
manifest).
91 Kaufman & Scott, supra note 74, at 374 (noting how during a crisis an “uncertainty R
discount” contributes to “liquidity problems”).
92 Kathryn Judge has described how a combination of illiquidity and uncertainty was a
source of distress for many firms during the 2008 crisis:
Without investment banks’ excessive reliance on . . . short-term financing,
for example, the reverberations of the systematic loss of information about
the value of the assets underlying [mortgage-backed securities] . . . would
likely not have been as severe.  At the same time, without information loss,
investment banks’ reliance on short-term financing might not have been so
problematic, and the magnitude of the 2007–2009 financial crisis might
have been much smaller.
Judge, supra note 75, at 701. R
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Importantly, the level of doubt about a financial institution’s sol-
vency need not be particularly high for its short-term creditors to de-
cide to demand their money back.  All that is required is that the
interest rate on the financial institution’s short-term debt be inade-
quate to compensate creditors for their estimate of the default risk, an
estimate that is likely to be revised upward during a crisis.93  It follows
that, in the typical financial crisis, more financial institutions will suf-
fer liquidity shortages than are actually insolvent.94
Not only do runs force financial institutions to sell assets at
fire-sale prices, but the causation also goes the other way, with fire
sales setting off runs.  This type of contagion can occur if the firms
being run upon try to raise cash by selling a type of security that is
widely used in the economy as collateral.  If the forced selling occurs
on a large enough scale, the influx of supply will push the security’s
market price below its fundamental value,95 triggering margin calls on
the contracts that the security is used to secure.  And if counterparties
cannot meet those margin calls, perhaps because of a general liquidity
shortage, then the contracts will be terminated and the previously
posted collateral will be sold, depressing market prices further.96  In
addition, firms that hold the depressed security as an investment will
suffer declines in the market values of their balance sheets, which
could touch off runs by short-term creditors that, in turn, cause more
fire sales.97  We might call this succession of forced asset sales the
“fire-sale price spiral.”  It is a manifestation of the role of illiquidity in
systemic risk, as cash shortages set the spiral in motion by forcing
firms to sell assets on a distressed basis.
Fears relating to illiquidity are perhaps the primary means by
which a financial crisis damages the real (nonfinancial) economy.
The mere threat of a run will cause financial institutions to hoard cash
by calling in loans and refusing to make new ones.98  As a result, busi-
nesses may be unable to borrow in the short term to meet payrolls or
93 To be sure, the firm can offer to pay more interest, and this does indeed sometimes
occur during a crisis. See Kathryn Judge, Three Discount Windows, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 795,
817 (2014) (citing evidence that banks offer “increasingly attractive interest rates” during a
crisis “as a way of retaining and attracting deposits”).  But a sudden increase in the offered
interest rate may only contribute to perceptions that the firm is insolvent.  And if
short-term creditors are sufficiently risk-averse, there may be no interest rate that can both
induce them to continue lending and permit the firm to turn a profit. See Kaufman &
Scott, supra note 74, at 374 (noting that “in periods of great uncertainty and stress” many R
creditors “will not lend at almost any rate”).
94 See Kaufman & Scott, supra note 74, at 373–74. R
95 See supra note 88. R
96 See PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 28. R
97 See Roe, supra note 6, at 1647. R
98 Jose Berrospide, Liquidity Hoarding and the Financial Crisis: An Empirical Evaluation,
BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS 3 (Apr. 2012), http://www.bis.org/bcbs/events/bhbibe/
berrospide.pdf.
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buy inventory.  Greater uncertainty leads to more cash hoarding and
hence a worse liquidity shortage.  It follows that reducing uncertainty
and keeping cash in circulation are among the most important regula-
tory objectives in a financial crisis.
Policymakers have long understood that maturity transformation
leaves traditional banks susceptible to debilitating runs.  During the
Great Depression, Congress tried to calm skittish depositors by creat-
ing the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC), which insures
checking and savings accounts.99  Starting in the 1970s, however, an-
other group of financial institutions began acting like traditional
banks, borrowing short term and investing the proceeds in relatively
illiquid assets.100  These are the so-called “shadow” banks whose ranks
include the investment banks and broker-dealers whose distress made
headlines in 2008.101  For many shadow banks, the equivalent of the
demand deposit is the repurchase agreement, or “repo,” which func-
tions like an overnight secured loan.102  Repos usually are rolled over
for long periods, which is why shadow banks can use them to fund
long-term investments.  The party in the lending position can, how-
ever, refuse to renew the repo at any time, effecting the equivalent of
a cash withdrawal.103  Because they engage in maturity transforma-
tion,104 shadow banks have relatively low cash ratios; they therefore
can quickly fail if their repo counterparties and other creditors lose
confidence.  But, at least officially, no government entity insures these
firms’ short-term obligations.
Each of the three sources of systemic risk identified here (com-
mon shocks, domino-effect insolvencies, and illiquidity) was evident in
the crisis of 2008.  The common-shock factor is illustrated by the fail-
ures or near-failures of eight large financial institutions that had in-
vested heavily in mortgage-backed assets: AIG, Bear Stearns, Fannie
Mae, Freddie Mac, Lehman Brothers, Merrill Lynch, Wachovia, and
Washington Mutual.105  The value of these firms’ balance sheets was
tied to residential housing prices, which peaked in mid-2006 and
99 Judge, supra note 93, at 827 (describing how Congress created the FDIC in 1933 “to R
improve bank stability by discouraging runs”).
100 See Gary Gordon & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the Shadow Banking System, BROOK-
INGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 269-79 (Fall 2010) (describing the rise of shadow banking).
101 Id. at 261–62 (describing investment banks, money-market mutual funds, and mort-
gage brokers as “shadow” banks).
102 See id. at 276 (describing repos as a “deposit-like product”).
103 Id. at 279.
104 See Andrei Shleifer, comment on Gary Gordon & Andrew Metrick, Regulating the
Shadow Banking System, BROOKINGS PAPERS ON ECON. ACTIVITY 298 (Fall 2010) (arguing
that the defining feature of the shadow banking system is maturity transformation through
securitization and repos).
105 See Bullard et al., supra note 58, at 404; Lehman Brothers Files for Bankruptcy, Scrambles R
to Sell Key Business, CNBC (Sept. 15, 2008, 3:26 AM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/26708143.
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had dropped more than twenty percent by October 2008.106
Domino-effect insolvencies, in turn, were illustrated when Lehman
Brothers filed for bankruptcy and defaulted on its debts, thereby caus-
ing the insolvency of Reserve Primary, a money-market fund that had
bought large amounts of Lehman-issued commercial paper.107
Reserve Primary’s failure, in turn, triggered runs on other money-mar-
ket funds, all of which were fundamentally solvent—thereby illustrat-
ing the illiquidity factor and its relationship to uncertainty.108
Illiquidity’s role in systemic risk is illustrated more broadly by the
runs that both traditional banks and shadow banks suffered in 2008
after the surge in mortgage defaults caused markets to fear that these
institutions were insolvent.  Depositor runs led the FDIC to arrange
buyouts of Wachovia and Washington Mutual, two of the nation’s larg-
est commercial banks.109  And runs by repo counterparties and other
short-term investors ended the independent existence of the invest-
ment banks Bear Stearns, Lehman Brothers and Merrill Lynch.110  Be-
cause they were not eligible for FDIC receivership, the only formal
resolution option for investment banks was bankruptcy.  But federal
officials considered bankruptcy an unacceptable outcome for large fi-
nancial institutions during the crisis—the conspicuous exception was
Lehman Brothers—and therefore decided to infuse them with cash to
keep them afloat.  In exchange for its money, the government typi-
cally took preferred shares that bailout recipients were not permitted
to buy back until they could demonstrate that they were neither illiq-
uid nor insolvent.111  Because the bailouts added to recipients’ cash
106 See S&P/Case-Shiller 20-City Composite Home Price Index, S&P DOW JONES INDICES
(2013), http://us.spindices.com/indices/real-estate/sp-case-shiller-20-city-composite-
home-price-index (showing an index peak of 206.7 in April 2006 and a drop to 156.3 in
October 2008); see also Bullard et al., supra note 58, at 403 (“The financial crisis of R
2008–09—the most severe since the 1930s—had its origins in the housing market.”).
107 See Bullard et al., supra note 58, at 408. R
108 “[W]hen the Reserve Primary Fund, a large money market mutual fund, halted
investor redemptions after the net asset value of its shares fell below $1 in September 2008,
share redemptions rose sharply at other money market mutual funds.  Although most
money market mutual funds had ample reserves and good assets, investors interpreted the
troubles of the Reserve Primary Fund (which held a large amount of Lehman Brothers
debt) as a possible indicator of problems at other mutual funds.”  Id.
109 See Robin Sidel et al., WaMu is Seized, Sold Off to J.P. Morgan, in Largest Failure in U.S.
Banking History, WALL ST. J., Sept. 26, 2008, at A1; Press Release, Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation, Citigroup Inc. to Acquire Banking Operations of Wachovia (Sept. 29, 2008),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08088.html.
110 See Gordon & Metrick, supra note 100, at 279 (stating that the “core problem in the R
financial crisis was a run on repos”).
111 See U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, OFFICE OF FIN. STABILITY, TROUBLED ASSET RELIEF
PROGRAM: FOUR YEAR RETROSPECTIVE REPORT 1, 6, 8 (2013), available at http://www.
treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/reports/Documents/TARP%%20Year%20
Retrospective%20Report.pdf [hereinafter DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP RETROSPECTIVE]
(describing TARP’s investments in AIG through the “Capital Purchase Program” and
“Targeted Investment Program” as taking the form of preferred shares).
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holdings but not their short-term debts, they raised the financial sec-
tor’s overall cash ratio, alleviating the liquidity pressure that is the by-
product of maturity transformation.
Since 2008, profits have recovered in the financial sector, and its
large bailout recipients have been able to pay back the government in
full, with interest.112  Indeed, taxpayers have made a net profit on the
financial-sector bailouts (as contrasted with those for the auto indus-
try).113  The implication is that the distressed market conditions of
2008 reflected primarily a problem of illiquidity rather than funda-
mental insolvency, and that most financial institutions needed only a
temporary increase in their cash ratios to weather the crisis.  The cen-
tral role of illiquidity in the crisis is further shown by the large in-
crease in excess cash reserves held by banks nationwide in 2008 and
2009.114  Thus, while very few of them were insolvent, the banks none-
theless felt compelled to hoard cash to hedge against the risk that
uncertainty would cause their depositors and other short-term credi-
tors to run.
In evaluating each of the mechanisms through which the clearing
mandate’s advocates and critics argue that clearinghouses either re-
duce or exacerbate systemic risk, it is important to specify the source
of systemic risk the mechanism purportedly targets.  Thus, by describ-
ing clearinghouses as enforcers of stricter collateral-posting rules,115
Dodd-Frank’s Senate Report implies that clearinghouses prevent
domino-effect insolvencies.116  The clearing mandate’s academic pro-
ponents also focus on the risk of domino-like insolvencies, but unlike
the Senate report they mostly argue that clearinghouses reduce this
risk through their traditional netting and loss-mutualization func-
tions.  The clearing mandate’s skeptics, meanwhile, have identified
ways in which netting and loss mutualization can increase systemic
risk, perhaps most importantly by weakening the incentive for deriva-
tives counterparties to monitor each other for excessive risk taking.
Notably, neither the proponents nor the skeptics have addressed the
relationship between systemic risk and illiquidity, despite that factor’s
central role in the events of 2008.
112 See Richard Squire, Insolvency vs. Illiquidity in the 2008 Crisis and the Congressional
Imagination, in CRISI FINANZIARIA E RISPOSTE NORMATIVE: VERSO UN NUOVO DIRITTO
DELL’ECONOMIA?  93–116 (Andrea Guaccero & Marco Maugeri, eds. 2013), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2392914.
113 See DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, TARP RETROSPECTIVE, supra note 111, at ii. R
114 See Berrospide, supra note 98, at 32–33 (documenting a large increase in bank R
holdings of cash and other liquid assets).
115 See supra text accompanying notes 64–67. R
116 See S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 32–33 (2010).
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C. The Debate over Netting
Most of the post-crisis debate about the relationship between
clearinghouses and systemic risk has focused on the implications of
multiparty netting.  According to several clearing-mandate propo-
nents, netting mitigates systemic risk by reducing losses to other
clearinghouse members when one member fails.  This argument is ad-
vanced most prominently in a 2010 report by fifteen financial econo-
mists called the Squam Lake Group.117  The report asserts that when a
clearinghouse can use netting to cancel out a group of counterparties’
positions, each counterparty “poses no risk to anyone, including the
clearinghouse.”118  Other scholars have made similar claims, arguing
that netting reduces overall losses when a counterparty fails.119
The numerical examples in Part I show why such arguments are
incomplete: netting in fact externalizes losses instead of reducing
them.  Thus, to the extent that netting increases recoveries for
clearinghouse members, it does so by decreasing nonmember recov-
eries by the same total amount.120  As Craig Pirrong and Mark Roe
both argue, netting is best conceptualized as a mechanism that
changes creditor priorities without reducing total losses when a
debtor fails.121  Roe further observes that clearinghouse netting builds
upon the bankruptcy allowance for setoffs and that scholars have long
recognized that setoffs redistribute losses rather than reducing
them.122
A more sophisticated pro-mandate argument based on netting’s
impact on creditor losses would acknowledge netting’s redistributive
nature but assert that netting nonetheless reduces systemic risk on the
assumption that clearinghouse members are more likely than their
outside creditors to be financial institutions.  The underlying assump-
tion is not implausible, as most clearinghouse members are broker-
ages and investment banks,123 while outside creditors include
nonfinancial claimants such as employees, trade creditors, and
117 KENNETH R. FRENCH ET AL., THE SQUAM LAKE REPORT: FIXING THE FINANCIAL SYSTEM
111–15 (2010).
118 Id. at 113.
119 See, e.g., Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 639, 675 (“Netting of positions would R
lead to reduction of overall exposure . . . .”); Kress, supra note 71, at 68 (claiming that R
netting causes a drop in “the aggregate level of exposure . . . , thereby mitigating
counterparty and systemic risks”).
120 See supra text accompanying notes 6–9. R
121 See Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 47; Roe, supra note 6, at 1667. R
122 Roe, supra note 6, at 1667 (citing McCoid, supra note 12, at 32–39); see also In re R
Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483, 485 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (noting that setoff
“advances[s] one unsecured creditor over another merely because the first happens also to
owe money to their common debtor”).
123 PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 8 (“Clearinghouses almost always have R
members who are trading firms, and often large ones, including brokerages and banks.”).
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industrial firms that use derivatives to hedge business risks.  Pirrong
anticipates this revised version of the pro-netting argument but rejects
it, observing that many outside creditors harmed by netting are also
financial institutions, including repo counterparties, traders of
non-cleared derivatives, and bank lenders.124  Roe further observes
that members’ outside creditors typically include money-market
funds, which are particularly vulnerable during a crisis.125  Their vul-
nerability was illustrated when the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers
led directly to the insolvency of Reserve Primary.126  For these reasons,
Pirrong and Roe argue, the purely redistributive effect of netting
seems unlikely to achieve a large reduction in the overall level of sys-
temic risk.127
Besides casting doubt on the benefits that the clearing mandate’s
proponents attribute to netting, Pirrong argues that netting actually
exacerbates systemic risk by reducing collateralization costs.128  As de-
scribed in Part I, netting makes it cheaper for a debtor to give priority
to select creditors because it avoids the costs of holding and posting
traditional collateral.  The priority that netting accords swaps
counterparties acts like a subsidy, encouraging more swaps to be is-
sued.129  The consequence could be higher levels of systemic risk due
to increased interconnectedness among financial institutions and
higher leverage through the types of contingent liabilities that swaps
create.130
D. The Debate over Loss Mutualization
While most of the clearing mandate’s proponents have empha-
sized netting, a few have also claimed that loss mutualization among
clearinghouse members can stabilize the financial system, again by
preventing domino-effect insolvencies.131  The theory is that the
124 Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 49. R
125 Roe, supra note 6, at 1682. R
126 See supra text accompanying notes 107–08. R
127 Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 49 (noting that netting redistributes R
losses rather than reducing them and that “[t]he systemic effect of this redistribution is
ambiguous”); Roe, supra note 6, at 1681. R
128 Pirrong, Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 59. R
129 Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 50 (“[R]eductions in collateral that R
would likely accompany the formation of a clearinghouse would actually tend to encourage
firms to trade more, as with a clearinghouse the netting of positions saves collateral, al-
lowing a larger scale of trading activity for a given amount of liquid capital.”); cf. Edwards &
Morrison, supra note 74, at 118 (observing how the Bankruptcy Code’s special treatment of R
derivatives, which “redistributes wealth from ordinary creditors to derivatives counterpar-
ties,” likely contributed to the growth of swaps markets in the 1990s).
130 Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 50. R
131 See Kress, supra note 71, at 65 (“From a systemic perspective, it is generally prefera- R
ble for a large number of parties to experience small losses than for a small number of
interconnected parties to experience large losses.”).
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manner in which a clearinghouse spreads losses among its members
“prevents an insolvent party’s trading partners from absorbing acute,
potentially catastrophic defaults.”132
Once again, the case for the clearing mandate has been subject to
strong rebuttals.  Pirrong observes: “If interconnectedness among big
financial institutions is the source of a systemic risk problem, creating
a central counterparty is an odd way to ‘solve’ it.  After all, a [clearing-
house] is a formalized interconnection among big financial institu-
tions.”133  Described concretely, loss mutualization means that a
clearinghouse takes the net in-house losses occasioned by one mem-
ber’s insolvency and, through the guaranty fund, divides them pro
rata among the surviving members.  The result is that some members
lose more, and others less, than if they had traded with the insolvent
firm bilaterally.  And there is no general reason to assume that the
members whose losses are thereby reduced will be both systemically
more important and closer to insolvency than the members whose
losses are thereby increased.  As is true of netting, loss mutualization
redistributes losses rather than avoiding them, making it difficult to
see how systemic risk is reliably reduced.
A somewhat different argument for clearinghouses based on loss
mutualization has been advanced by Adam Levitin, who theorizes that
a clearinghouse’s primary systemic virtue is its capacity to absorb losses
when a dealer firm fails.134  Levitin argues that a properly designed
and maintained guaranty fund makes a clearinghouse a “fortress of
capital.”135  To the extent, however, that a clearinghouse holds capital
that its members would otherwise hold individually, the impact on the
members’ creditors is again zero-sum: more assets are available for
in-house creditors but fewer are available for each member’s outside
creditors.  Levitin might be implying that the guaranty fund effectively
acts like (or on behalf of) a prudential regulator, forcing members to
hold more of their assets in liquid form than they would otherwise.  By
analogy, bank regulators seek to reduce systemic risk by requiring
banks to hold minimum cash reserves.  But there is a limit to how
much of its capital a firm can tie up in an unproductive cash buffer
and still turn a profit.136  It is not clear how this constraint is alleviated
132 Id.; accord Adam J. Levitin, Response: The Tenuous Case for Derivatives Clearinghouses,
101 GEO. L.J. 445, 462 (2013) (arguing that a clearinghouse “disperses excess losses
among . . . members, thereby lessening the impact on any one of them”).
133 Pirrong, Clearinghouse Cure, supra note 5, at 49. R
134 Levitin, supra note 132, at 462. R
135 Id. at 448.
136 See Jonathan Macey, Reducing Systemic Risk: The Role of Money Market Mutual Funds as
Substitutes for Federally Insured Bank Deposits, 17 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 131, 165 (2011)
(“Reserve requirements constitute a significant tax on the operation of depository institu-
tions because they do not generate income.”).
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if the cash is held not by the firm itself but rather by a clearinghouse
on its behalf.  Once again, the source of value creation, as opposed to
value transfer, is unclear.
Pirrong and Roe both also note that the clearing mandate’s pro-
ponents ignore the other way that clearinghouses spread losses: by
guaranteeing customer trades.  Because a clearinghouse reassigns a
failed member’s customer contracts to other members, the customers
recover more than they would if their only recourse were to the failed
member’s bankruptcy estate.  As contrasted with clearinghouse mem-
bers, many customers are end-users, who use derivatives to hedge busi-
ness risk.  Because most end-users are not financial institutions,
mutualization of customer losses appears to increase systemic risk by
shifting losses up rather than down the systemic-risk gradient.137
Finally, the clearing mandate’s critics argue that both loss exter-
nalization (through netting and collateral collection) and loss mutual-
ization could contribute to systemic risk by weakening the link
between each member’s insolvency risk and its trading costs.  Thus,
firms in a bilateral trading market will normally monitor counterparty
default risk and require riskier counterparties to pay higher interest
rates or post more collateral.138  This market discipline means that
counterparties can reduce their trading costs by lowering their per-
ceived insolvency risk.139  And a firm that has reduced its insolvency
risk, for example by avoiding concentrated investments in risky assets
(such as mortgage-backed securities), is less likely to be either a
source or a victim of contagion in a crisis.140  But loss externalization
and mutualization weaken counterparties’ incentive to discipline each
other because they cause each clearinghouse member to bear, at
most, only a fraction of the counterparty risk on its in-house
positions.141
In theory, the clearinghouse could attempt to impose the type of
discipline that firms in a bilateral market would impose on each other
137 See Pirrong, Economics of Clearing, supra note 18, at 57 (noting that the practice R
whereby “members provide performance guarantees to non-members” can increase sys-
temic risk if “dealer-members are systemically more important than the non-members”).
138 See id., at 17–18 (noting how counterparties in bilateral markets can vary collateral
demands based on firm-specific default risk, thereby avoiding the type of moral hazard
created by clearinghouse collateralization rules); accord PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note
24, at 15 (noting how private firms specialize in developing risk models that increase trad- R
ing profits).
139 Recall how protection buyers excused AIG from posting initial margin as long as it
retained its triple-A credit rating. See supra text accompanying note 56. R
140 Of course, when there is sector-wide misvaluation of assets—the paradigm of sys-
temic risk from an asset bubble—financial firms are unlikely to discipline each other ade-
quately even in their bilateral contracts.
141 See PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 17. R
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directly.142  But clearinghouse employees may lack the incentive and
expertise to analyze counterparty credit risk effectively.  A clearing-
house does not trade on its own account and hence has less opportu-
nity to recoup investments in sophisticated risk models.143  And
members will naturally be reluctant to share their best risk models
with clearinghouse employees for fear of discovery by other members,
among whom are often their biggest competitors.144
The relative inferiority of clearinghouses at assessing credit risk
helps explain why they typically follow mechanical margin-posting
rules.145  For example, clearinghouses require that variation margin
be adjusted daily based on formulas that consider the market values of
each member’s cleared positions and posted collateral but typically
ignore the performance of the rest of members’ balance sheets.146  At
first blush, such an approach seems blinkered, as losses on assets held
outside the clearinghouse could cause a member to default on its
in-house obligations.  But this mechanical approach minimizes the
discretion of clearinghouse employees, who presumably lack the
knowledge and motivation to exercise discretion effectively.  Mechani-
cal rules also make it harder for a member to influence clearinghouse
employees to the member’s relative advantage, for example by permit-
ting it to operate with an unmatched book.
* * * * *
This Part has shown how concerns raised by skeptics cast doubt
on the arguments that previously have been advanced in support of
the clearing mandate.  Aspects of those arguments may survive: for
example, it may be true that, on average, clearinghouse members are
more systemically important than their outside creditors and there-
fore that the redistributive impact of netting may somewhat reduce
the risk in a crisis that financial institutions will become insolvent.  But
even if that is right, there are countervailing ways in which clearing-
houses can increase systemic risk: for example, both loss externaliza-
tion and loss mutualization undermine monitoring discipline and
thus encourage financial institutions to make risky investments that, if
142 See Roe, supra note 6, at 1694–95 (“Whether the clearinghouse reduces systemic R
risk in this setting depends largely on whether the clearinghouse employees are better than
[the member’s] management at understanding the market moves in the relevant trades.”).
143 See PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 15. R
144 Id. at 14–15.
145 See Craig Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates: A New Liquidity Trap?, 24 J. AP-
PLIED CORP. FIN. 67, 70 (2012) (describing the “more mechanical nature of [clearing-
house] margining methodologies”) [hereinafter Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates].
146 See id. (“[W]ith clearing, the variation margining process is substantially more rigid
than is typical in bilateral transactions.”); PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 17 (not- R
ing that traditional clearinghouses “do not vary risk pricing (i.e., collateral levels) to reflect
the balance-sheet risks specific to each member”).
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they sour, could trigger a crisis.  After reviewing the arguments for
and against the clearing mandate advanced so far, it would be easy to
agree with the critics that the mandate is as likely to increase systemic
risk as reduce it.
III
CENTRAL CLEARING AS A SOURCE OF LIQUIDITY
AND CERTAINTY
This Part seeks to move the debate over clearinghouses beyond
their purely redistributive consequences by identifying an economic
benefit of central clearing that is not zero-sum in its impact on credi-
tors.  That benefit is faster cash payouts when a trading firm fails.
Faster cash payouts are a result of multiparty netting, but they differ
from the advantages that other scholars have claimed for netting, in
two respects.  First, the faster payouts achieved by netting represent a
Pareto improvement: netting causes some creditors to be paid more
quickly without causing others to be paid less quickly.  Second, fast
cash payouts avoid damage to the financial sector resulting from illi-
quidity, a source of systemic risk largely ignored in prior clearing-
house scholarship.  The clearinghouse accelerates cash payouts by
engaging in liquidity partitioning: it cordons off a portion of a bank-
rupt firm’s cash assets and short-term liabilities, and it applies the first
toward immediate repayment of the second.  As a result, clearing-
house members are spared the liquidity shock that they might other-
wise suffer when one of their counterparties files for bankruptcy.
Thus, like a government bailout, the clearinghouse improves the fi-
nancial sector’s overall cash ratio, but it does so by improving the allo-
cation of cash already in private hands.
The rest of this Part is divided into four subparts. The first de-
scribes the problem of payout delay in bankruptcy and shows how the
setoff right, the basis for multiparty netting, helps overcome it.  The
second describes how bankruptcy changes the allocation of cash in
the particular setting of a derivatives market in which contracts are
bilateral.  The third shows how introducing a clearinghouse speeds up
payouts, thereby reallocating cash in a way that helps stabilize the fi-
nancial sector by improving its overall cash ratio.  The final subpart
makes two points about the risk that a clearinghouse itself will fail: it
shows how liquidity partitioning makes a clearinghouse more stable
than its members; and it describes how, if a clearinghouse nonetheless
were to fail, it could still reduce illiquidity during a crisis.
A. Bankruptcy, Delay, and Setoff
To determine how much to pay each of a debtor’s creditors, a
bankruptcy proceeding must do two things.  First, it must assign a
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value to the debtor’s assets, either through sales that convert the assets
to cash (if a liquidation) or through a court-approved valuation based
on projections of the debtor’s post-bankruptcy performance (if a reor-
ganization).147  Second, the proceeding must determine the amount
of the debtor’s liabilities, which requires collecting all creditors’
proofs of claim and resolving any challenges to their enforceability.148
Given these requirements, it is difficult to think of a slower rule for
distributing value to creditors than the pro rata rule.  That rule pays
each creditor based on the ratio between the creditor’s claim and the
debtor’s total liabilities.  It follows that all liabilities must be confirmed
and valuated before any creditor can be paid.149  Despite this draw-
back, the pro rata rule is the bankruptcy system’s default formula for
calculating creditor payouts.150
The Bankruptcy Code does permit several exceptions to the pro
rata rule.  In particular, it allows for the enforcement of various
asset-partitioning arrangements that override the pro rata rule to give
a creditor a prior claim to a particular debtor asset.151  Perhaps the
most obvious example is the secured loan, which the Bankruptcy
Code enforces in the sense that it honors secured creditors’ prior
147 In the Chapter 11 system, parties negotiate over a reorganization plan based on
their expectations of the value that the court will assign the debtor if an a agreement
cannot be reached. See 11 U.S.C. § 1129(b) (2012) (allowing the bankruptcy court to ap-
prove a plan over an investor class’s objection if the investors are to receive a payout that,
in the court’s estimation, equals at least their payout entitlement under both the absolute
priority rule and the pro rata rule).
148 Grounds for challenging a creditor’s claim include that it is duplicative, unenforce-
able because the creditor breached the loan agreement, untimely, or resulted from a
fraudulent transfer. See, e.g., Sara Randazzo, Dewey Estate Moves to Shed Dozens of Creditors’
Claims, AM LAW DAILY (Oct. 31, 2012) (describing attempts by a debtor in possession to
invalidate “several dozen” claims on various grounds).
149 Richard Squire, The Case for Symmetry in Creditors’ Rights, 118 YALE L.J. 806, 836
(2009).
150 See 11 U.S.C. § 726(b) (providing in liquidation for pro rata distribution among
unsecured creditors of the same bankruptcy rank); id. § 1123(a)(4) (requiring that a pro-
posed reorganization plan treat all class members equally).
151 See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, The Essential Role of Organizational Law,
110 YALE L.J. 387, 393–96 (2000) (introducing the term “asset partitioning” and identifying
several legal arrangements that produce it, including corporations, partnerships, and se-
cured loans).  Early work on asset partitioning described how it can make it cheaper for
creditors to monitor debtors. Id. at 399–404; see also Richard A. Posner, The Rights of Credi-
tors of Affiliated Corporations, 43 U. CHI. L. REV. 499, 509–16 (1976) (describing how the
corporate rule of limited shareholder liability can reduce the costs of evaluating credit
risk).  A partitioning arrangement will, however, tend to generate monitoring efficiencies
only if it is “symmetrical,” meaning that it gives each creditor group a prior claim to a
distinct pool of assets.  Squire, supra note 149, at 814–35.  The corporation form has this R
quality. Id. at 812.  By contrast, monitoring efficiencies are unlikely to result from an ar-
rangement that is, like the setoff right, “asymmetrical,” meaning that it gives a creditor
both a prior claim to a distinct debtor asset and a pro rata claim to the debtor’s remaining
assets. Id. at 811.  Asymmetrical arrangements can, however, still create economic value by
accelerating payouts to the creditors with the prior claims. Id. at 836.
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claim to their collateral.152  And, as the discussion in Part I makes
clear, the setoff right is an asset-partitioning arrangement as well.
Thus, setoff overrides the pro rata rule by giving one creditor a prior
claim to a particular debtor asset, namely the creditor’s own unpaid
debt to the debtor.  Scholars have long recognized that this prior
claim redistributes value to the setoff creditor.153  But they have found
it difficult to justify this outcome,154 at least on efficiency grounds.155
A source of efficiency becomes apparent, however, if we shift the
focus from the amounts of creditor payouts to their timing.  By giving
the setoff creditor a prior claim to a particular debtor asset, the setoff
right avoids the delay inherent in the pro rata rule.  The value of that
asset can be distributed to the creditor once the creditor’s claim is
confirmed, regardless of the amount of the debtor’s other liabili-
ties.156  To be sure, the distribution takes the form not of a cash pay-
out but rather of cancellation of the creditor’s own payment
obligation.  Yet the practical effect is the same: without setoff, the
creditor would have to pay cash into the estate and then wait to be
repaid a pro rata share of that cash along with the debtor’s other
creditors.
This faster payout for the setoff creditor will almost always re-
present a Pareto improvement, meaning that setoff will not cause the
debtor’s remaining creditors to be paid any less quickly.  Regardless of
whether setoff is allowed, the other creditors will be paid at the end of
152 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 506(a)(1) (giving creditors a secured claim to the extent of the
value of their collateral); id. § 1129(b)(2)(A)(i) (requiring that a class of secured creditors
that has rejected a reorganization plan receive cash payments worth at least the amount of
their secured claims).
153 See, e.g., McCoid, supra note 12, at 15 (“It is hardly news that setoff . . . is preferen- R
tial in effect.”).
154 See, e.g., id. at 39–41 (raising but ultimately dismissing as inadequate various poten-
tial “functional” justifications for setoff); accord In re Elcona Homes Corp., 863 F.2d 483,
486 (7th Cir. 1988) (Posner, J.) (noting that setoffs are recognized under state law for their
“procedural convenience—the consolidation of offsetting claims in the same suit” but that
this consideration may have little relevance in federal bankruptcy law given the collective
nature of the proceeding).
155 In his seminal work on the setoff right, John McCoid suggested that the right might
be justified in terms of fairness (rather than efficiency) between creditor and debtor in the
particular context of a bankruptcy proceeding in which the debtor’s debts will not be dis-
charged, which leaves creditors who are not allowed to set off facing “uncertainty [about]
whether and when payment might be made.”  McCoid, supra note 12, at 23.  McCoid did R
not address how setoff accelerates payouts even when all debts will ultimately be dis-
charged or how this benefit is a source of economic efficiencies.
156 Two prior articles on asset partitioning introduced the general idea that partition-
ing arrangements (which, as this Article observes, includes the setoff right) can accelerate
creditor payouts in bankruptcy proceedings. See Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman &
Richard Squire, Law and the Rise of the Firm, 119 HARV. L. REV. 1335, 1346 (2006) (identify-
ing reduced bankruptcy administration costs and faster proceedings as a benefit of asset
partitioning); Squire, supra note 149, at 835 (analyzing how various forms of asset partition- R
ing accelerate creditor payouts by overriding the pro rata rule).
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the bankruptcy proceeding, which typically takes at least a year (and
often several) to complete.157  The requirements that make a lengthy
process necessary—that the debtor’s noncash assets be sold or valu-
ated, and that its total liabilities be calculated—are not avoided or
simplified if some creditors are denied setoff rights at the beginning.
The distinction between the zero-sum impact of the setoff right
(emphasized by previous commentators) and its positive impact on
payout speed (emphasized here) becomes clearest if we make the as-
sumption that the debtor is, despite its bankruptcy filing, solvent.  In
that case, setoff will have no impact on the distribution of losses, as all
of the debtor’s creditors will eventually be repaid in full.  But it will
still reduce delay, accelerating payouts to some creditors without slow-
ing down payouts to the rest.
While setoff avoids the delay inherent in the pro rata rule, it nor-
mally is not instantaneous.  The other source of delay is the
Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay, under which creditors cannot exer-
cise setoff rights until they obtain permission from the bankruptcy
court.158  The Code recognizes an exception, however, when the off-
setting obligations arise from derivatives contracts, including swaps.159
In that case, creditors can exercise contractual setoff rights immedi-
ately when the debtor files its bankruptcy petition.
Faster bankruptcy payouts provide general economic benefits:
they reduce uncertainty about the value of creditor claims, and they
create value whenever a debtor is being liquidated and its capital can
earn higher returns if reinvested elsewhere, a safe general assumption
given that the firm has failed.160  But faster payouts will be especially
valuable if the recipients are financial institutions who are in danger
of failing during a crisis for lack of liquidity.  Under those circum-
stances, faster payouts reduce systemic risk by correcting the tendency
for bankruptcy to misallocate cash during a financial crisis.  The next
subpart begins the explanation of this systemic benefit by describing
how bankruptcy misallocates cash in a derivatives market in which
contracts are bilateral.
B. Bankruptcy and Liquidity in a Bilateral Market
Bankruptcy can exacerbate a liquidity crisis.  When a company
files for bankruptcy protection, the automatic stay suspends its
157 See Richard M. Hynes & Steven D. Walt, Why Banks are not Allowed in Bankruptcy, 67
WASH. & LEE L. REV. 985, 1050 (2010) (reporting that the average bankruptcy case of a
large public corporation lasts just under eighteen months).
158 See 11 U.S.C. § 362(a)(7) (2012).
159 Id. § 556 (commodities and forward contracts); id. § 560 (swaps); see also id.
§ 362(b)(17) (specifying that the automatic-stay exemption applies to swap contract setoff
rights).
160 See Squire, supra note 149, at 835–36. R
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 39  6-MAY-14 11:35
2014] CLEARINGHOUSES AS LIQUIDITY PARTITIONING 895
payment obligations to creditors,161 effectively increasing the duration
of its short-term debts.  If its short-term creditors include financial in-
stitutions, the resulting liquidity shock could cause them to fail as well.
At the same time, firms that owe money to the debtor must pay cash
into the bankruptcy estate, even though bankruptcy actually reduces
the debtor’s need for cash by suspending its debt repayment obliga-
tions and making it easier for the debtor to borrow.  In this way, bank-
ruptcy misallocates cash during a financial crisis, increasing the risk
that otherwise solvent financial institutions will fail.
The liquidity problem created by bankruptcy can be illustrated
using the open, three-firm example from Part I, in which Firm A owes
$100 on a bilateral derivatives contract to Firm B, and Firm B owes
$100 on an identical contract to Firm C.  We will now assume that all
three firms are “shadow banks”: financial institutions that engage
in maturity transformation but whose short-term debts are not
FDIC-insured.
TABLE 1. SELECTED BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS, PRE-BANKRUPTCY
Firm A Firm B Firm C
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilites Assets Liabilities
Liquid/ $100 cash $100 $100 claim $100 $100 claim Repos.
Short-term debt to B on A debt to C on B etc.
------------------------------ ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
Illiquid/
Long-term
The table shows balance-sheet items that are relevant to the analy-
sis of bankruptcy’s impact on liquidity.  Firm A has cash,162 and it has
a short-term liability to Firm B.  Firm B, in turn, has a current asset (its
short-term claim against Firm A), which is matched by its short-term
liability to Firm C.  Finally, Firm C has a short-term claim against Firm
B, and it has short-term debts such as repos, reflecting its status as a
maturity transformer.  (Indeed, Firm C may have a short-term liability
that precisely matches its claim against Firm B, which would be the
case if it is acting as an intermediary on a derivatives position between
Firm B and an end-user.)  Notably, these assets and liabilities are
matched not just in amount but also in duration, with short-term lia-
bilities counterbalanced by cash and other liquid (current) assets.
161 11 U.S.C. § 362(a).
162 This could be actual currency or, more likely, a $100 balance in a demand deposit
account at a commercial bank that is a member of the Federal Reserve System.  A positive
balance in a bank account is generally considered a form of cash and thus would be in-
cluded in Firm A’s cash ratio. See JOHN DOWNES & JORDAN ELLIOT GOODMAN, DICTIONARY
OF FINANCE AND INVESTMENT TERMS 78 (4th ed 1995) (defining “cash” as “paper currency
and coins, negotiable money orders and checks, and bank balances”).
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Now we will consider, as we did in Part One, what happens when
Firm B files for bankruptcy.163  The bankruptcy filing causes Firm B’s
contract with Firm A to terminate and makes Firm A’s $100 debt im-
mediately payable.164  Accordingly, Firm A pays its cash into Firm B’s
estate in satisfaction of its debt, removing both items from Firm A’s
balance sheet.
TABLE 2. SELECTED BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS, BILATERAL CONTRACTS
Firm A Firm B Firm C
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilites Assets Liabilities
Liquid/ [Cash sent [Paid] $100 cash Repos.
Short-term to B] etc.
-------------------------------- ----------------------------- -------------------------------------
Illiquid/ IOU IOU
Long-term to C from B 
The effect of the bankruptcy on Firm B’s and Firm C’s balance
sheets is more complicated.  Even though bankruptcy terminates Firm
B’s derivatives contract with Firm C, the automatic stay suspends Firm
C’s ability to collect on the resulting unsecured claim against Firm
B.165  Thus, instead of receiving cash, Firm C receives, in effect, a
bankruptcy IOU that is a liability on Firm B’s balance sheet and an
asset on Firm C’s.  Its value is uncertain, as is its duration, save that it is
unlikely to be paid in the short term.  The claim will be paid accord-
ing to the pro rata rule, which as noted above is a very slow way to
calculate creditor payout entitlements.  The delay that the pro rata
rule can introduce when the debtor is a financial company is illus-
trated by the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, which did not see its first
payouts to unsecured creditors until more than three years after it
began.166
As Table 2 indicates, bankruptcy has produced durational mis-
matches on the balance sheets of both Firm B and Firm C.  A liquid
asset (cash) has been paid into Firm B’s estate even though the practi-
cal consequence of the automatic stay is that Firm B no longer has any
short-term, pre-bankruptcy  debts.  Meanwhile, bankruptcy has
163 See supra Figure 1.
164 See 11 U.S.C. § 542(b) (providing that entities which owe matured debts to the
debtor must immediately pay them to the bankruptcy trustee).
165 The special exemption for derivatives allows counterparties to ignore the automatic
stay for purposes of terminating contracts, setting off positions, and liquidating collateral.
See id. §§ 560, 561.  However, the stay on enforcement actions (for any remaining amount
owed) remains in effect.  The debate over whether these special exemptions for derivatives
are justified as a policy matter is discussed in Part V.A., below.
166 See Joseph Checkler, Lehman’s First Bankruptcy Payout: $22.5 Billion, WALL ST. J. (Apr.
11, 2012, 1:33 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014240527023043566045
77337862433054558.
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pushed back the maturity of an asset of Firm C, exacerbating the mis-
match that already characterizes its balance sheet due to its role as a
maturity transformer.  Firm C therefore suffers a liquidity shock.  If it
is running low on cash, perhaps because a financial panic has frozen
credit marks and its short-term creditors are running, its inability to
collect from Firm B could cause it to fail.  Indeed, Firm C’s status as a
creditor of Firm B will increase its creditors’ propensity to run because
they will be uncertain about how Firm B’s failure will affect Firm C’s
solvency and liquidity.
Could Firm C convert its bankruptcy claim to cash more quickly
by selling it to a third party?  In theory the answer is yes, but in prac-
tice this is unlikely to be an attractive option.  The claim is an illiquid
asset because its ultimate value is highly uncertain: the value will be
based on the outcome of a bankruptcy proceeding that is likely to take
years to complete.  Prospective buyers therefore would be unwilling to
buy the claim at its true expected value until they had spent time in-
vestigating Firm B’s assets and liabilities and the likely legal issues in
its bankruptcy proceeding.  But time is something that Firm C will
lack if all of its short-term creditors are demanding their money back.
Thus, to convert the claim to cash quickly, Firm C would probably
have to sell it at a deep discount not only to its face value but also to a
reasonable estimate of its expected value.  Such a sale would do little
for Firm C’s liquidity problem and might also threaten its solvency.
The fact that a financial crisis is underway, and therefore that many
prospective buyers will be especially reluctant to part with cash, will
only tend to deepen the price discount.
Alternatively, could Firm C borrow the cash it needs to tide it
over until it gets its bankruptcy payout from Firm B’s estate?  Under
normal circumstances the answer should again be yes, but in a finan-
cial crisis the situation changes.  Firm C’s status as a creditor of a
failed firm will make potential lenders suspect that it too is now insol-
vent.  And any potential lender would rationally fear that its loan pro-
ceeds will be siphoned off by Firm C’s short-term creditors in a run,
forcing Firm C into bankruptcy and leaving the lender with a delayed
bankruptcy payout.  These factors increase Firm C’s reliance on its
$100 claim against Firm B as a source of short-term funding, a source
that bankruptcy denies.
While Firm C will probably find it difficult to engage in new bor-
rowing, the same is not true of Firm B.  Once a debtor files a bank-
ruptcy petition, the automatic stay raises a barricade around its assets,
reassuring post-petition lenders that their loan proceeds will not be
drawn off in a run.  And to protect post-petition lenders against the
risk that the debtor is insolvent, the Bankruptcy Code gives them pri-
ority over pre-petition creditors in the division of the debtor’s
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assets.167  The Code grants this priority so that the debtor can raise
funds to pay its administrative claimants: the utilities, employees, trade
creditors, lawyers, and accountants whose inputs a debtor consumes
while in bankruptcy.  For these reasons, a financial institution that has
entered bankruptcy’s safe haven during a crisis will usually be consid-
ered much more creditworthy than the financial institutions that re-
main outside.168  Bankruptcy’s capacity to increase a firm’s
creditworthiness is the reason that Lehman Brothers, despite being
brought to its knees by a lack of liquidity, was able to obtain a new,
$450 million loan a few days after it filed for bankruptcy.169
The three-firm example has demonstrated how bankruptcy misal-
locates cash during a financial crisis.  Bankruptcy requires the pay-
ment of cash into the estate of the failed firm (Firm B), whose relative
demand for cash is low due to the automatic stay and the priority
granted to post-petition lenders.  At the same time, bankruptcy denies
cash to the debtor’s short-term creditors (Firm C), whose demand for
cash is high because of the risk that they will suffer a run.  The exam-
ple shows that if the economy is suffering a liquidity crisis, a bank-
ruptcy filing by a firm with short-term debts to financial institutions
will make the problem worse.
At first it might seem that Firm B’s bankruptcy has made the fi-
nancial sector more liquid in one respect: it has brought about the
discharge of Firm A’s short-term debt to Firm B, thereby reducing the
denominator of the financial sector’s overall cash ratio.  But the analy-
sis is incomplete until we consider what happens to the cash that Firm
A has paid into Firm B’s estate.  One possibility is that the trustee will
use the cash to pay administrative claimants, thereby displacing cash
that the estate would have raised for this purpose through
post-petition borrowing.  But administrative claimants usually are not
financial institutions; therefore, payments to them do not improve the
financial sector’s overall liquidity position.  Alternatively, the trustee
will simply hold onto the cash until it starts repaying Firm B’s un-
secured creditors.170  Cash holdings by bankruptcy estates can be
quite large: four years into the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy, the
167 See 11 U.S.C. § 364(b) (allowing post-petition borrowing that is classified as an ad-
ministrative expense); id. § 507(a) (prioritizing administrative expenses over prepetition
unsecured claims).  The Code also empowers the bankruptcy judge to give a post-petition
lender a “priming” lien that is senior to the liens of pre-petition secured creditors. See id.
§ 364(d).
168 See Kenneth Ayotte & David A. Skeel, Jr., Bankruptcy Law as Liquidity Provider, 80 U.
CHI. L. REV. 1557, 1589–90 (2013) (describing how administrative priority for post-petition
lenders alleviates debtor liquidity shortages).
169 See Lehman Bros. Holdings, Inc., Current Report (Form 8-K), at 2 (Sept. 16, 2008),
available at http://www.implu.com/releases/2008/20080922/14063/implu_viewer.
170 As observed in note 162, supra, this cash could take the form of currency, but it is R
more likely to be a positive balance in a demand deposit account at a commercial bank.
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estate still held $14.3 billion in restricted cash, including $10.9 billion
in a fund reserved for paying unsecured claims.171
What the bankruptcy trustee is not likely to do is use the cash to
make new loans or otherwise engage in maturity transformation.  This
certainly will be true if the debtor is liquidating, in which case its oper-
ations effectively cease except to the extent necessary to wind down its
affairs.  And even if the debtor is trying to reorganize, it is unlikely to
engage in new lending during a financial crisis.  Thus, regardless of
whether the trustee holds the cash in a reserve fund or uses it to pay
administrative claimants, the cash will effectively have left the financial
sector upon entering the bankruptcy estate, not to reenter (in whole
or part) until the proceeding is completed and creditors are repaid.172
For these reasons, Firm A’s discharge of its short-term debt to Firm B
will not improve the financial sector’s overall cash ratio, as it will de-
crease the numerator (cash holdings) by the same amount it de-
creases the denominator (short-term debts).  Combined with the
increase in the duration of Firm C’s claim against Firm B, the overall
effect of Firm B’s bankruptcy is to make the financial sector less liquid
than it was before.
C. Multiparty Netting as a Liquidity Source
If, on the other hand, the bankrupt firm’s contracts are centrally
cleared, then its counterparties are spared a liquidity shock, and the
financial sector’s liquidity position is unambiguously improved.  Re-
call from Part I that when a clearinghouse is introduced into the
three-firm example, it can use its setoff right to cancel the obligations
running to and from Firm B.173  As a result, Firm A’s cash payment
does not enter Firm B’s bankruptcy estate; rather, the clearinghouse
intercepts the cash and relays it directly to Firm C.  The effect on the
three firms’ balance sheets is shown in Table 3.
171 Linda Sandler, Lehman, Affiliates Had $14.3 Billion in Restricted Cash, BLOOMBERG
(Oct. 31, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-10-31/lehman-affiliates-
had-14-3-billion-restricted-cash-correct-.html.
172 If the debtor is being liquidated instead of reorganized, its cash will reenter the
financial sector at the end of the bankruptcy proceeding only to the extent it is used to
repay financial-sector creditors.
173 See supra Figure 2.
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TABLE 3. SELECTED BALANCE-SHEET ITEMS, CLEARED CONTRACTS
Firm A Firm B Firm C
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilites Assets Liabilities
Liquid/ [Cash sent [Paid] [Set off] [Set off] $100 cash Repos.
Short-term to C] etc.
-------------------------------- ----------------------------------- -----------------------------------
Illiquid/
Long-term
Through multiparty netting, the clearinghouse has prevented the
double durational mismatch that Firm B’s bankruptcy caused when
the contracts were bilateral.  The short-term liabilities owed by Firms
A and B have both been discharged, and no new debts have been
created.  Meanwhile, the cash that started with Firm A remains in the
financial sector: it is now with Firm C, which is better able to survive a
creditor run as a result.  Like a bailout, the clearinghouse has in-
creased the financial sector’s overall cash ratio, but it has done so by
making better use of cash already in private hands.  And, by fixing the
amount of Firm C’s recovery immediately, the clearinghouse has re-
duced uncertainty about Firm C’s own solvency, decreasing the
chances that a run on Firm C will begin in the first place.174
Another way to understand the liquidity benefit of central clear-
ing is to observe that the clearinghouse saves a debtor’s pre-bank-
ruptcy, short-term creditors from being forced to serve as lenders to
the bankruptcy estate.175  Without the clearinghouse, the automatic
stay effectively forces Firm C to extend Firm B’s estate $100 in credit
for the duration of the bankruptcy proceeding.  Such an involuntary
loan might be systemically unproblematic if Firm C is not itself suffer-
ing a liquidity shortage.  But there is no general reason to assume that
this is the case; Firm C’s known status as a creditor of a bankrupt firm
implies that the opposite will be more likely.  Introducing a clearing-
house forces Firm B to raise any cash it needs for administrative ex-
penses from post-petition lenders, who lend voluntarily.  And we can
be confident that a firm that is willing to lend is not suffering its own
liquidity shortage.  In this way, the clearinghouse shifts the burden of
174 When discussing the benefits of FDIC insurance for demand deposits, Richard
Hynes and Steven Walt made the same general point about the banking system, noting that
“[s]peed provides two closely related benefits: liquidity and confidence in the banking sys-
tem.” See Hynes & Walt, supra note 157, at 1008.  FDIC insurance is like a government R
bailout in that it involves a cash injection from a government entity to achieve these bene-
fits, as contrasted with the clearinghouse’s method of obtaining these benefits through
more efficient allocation of cash in private hands.
175 See Ayotte & Skeel, supra note 168, at 1623 (“The automatic stay on ordinary credi- R
tors functions as a coerced loan, . . . as does the debtor’s ability to halt payments to its
creditors.”)
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the debtor’s liquidity requirements to those lenders that can best bear
it.
The Lehman Brothers bankruptcy is again useful to cite, here as
an illustration of how clearinghouses can stabilize markets by increas-
ing the speed and certainty of creditor payouts during a crisis.  When
it filed for bankruptcy, Lehman was a major trader in options, futures,
and interest-rate swaps, all of which were centrally cleared, and in
credit default swaps, which were not.176  Clearinghouses resolved
Lehman’s cleared positions promptly without suffering disruptions at-
tributable to illiquidity or asset fire sales.177  By contrast, collateral
posted to Lehman by the firm’s credit default swap counterparties was
still trapped in the estate several years after the bankruptcy filing,
while other swap counterparties waited to be paid.178  And the credit
default swap market suffered disruptive price volatility immediately af-
ter the bankruptcy filing because of uncertainty about the identity of
Lehman’s counterparties and how much they would lose.179
Not only does a derivatives clearinghouse speed up payouts to
members, but it also simplifies the work of the failed member’s bank-
ruptcy trustee, which could translate into faster payouts for the
outside creditors as well.  Continuing with the three-firm example,
multiparty netting via the clearinghouse means that Firm B’s bank-
ruptcy trustee does not have to enforce the estate’s claim against Firm
A, nor does she have to confirm and process Firm C’s proof of claim.
In a division of administrative labor, these tasks are handled by the
clearinghouse instead.  With fewer assets and creditors to sort out, the
trustee may be able to complete her work more quickly, permitting
faster payouts for Firm B’s general creditors.  While these outside
creditors’ total recoveries may be reduced by netting’s redistributive
effect (if Firm B is insolvent), the loss may be partly neutralized be-
cause of the time value of money and reduced administrative costs.
The example shows how multiparty netting redistributes insolvency
risk but not illiquidity risk; rather, it creates value by preserving liquid-
ity that otherwise would be lost through bankruptcy.
While just about any asset-partitioning arrangement has the po-
tential to accelerate creditor payouts, only a subset will reduce
176 Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 655–56. R
177 See id. at 655–56 (noting that clearinghouses resolved Lehman’s futures and op-
tions positions within one week); Will Acworth, The Lessons of Lehman: Reassessing Customer
Protections, FUTURES INDUSTRY, Jan./Feb. 2009, at 36 (noting that the clearinghouse
LCH.Clearnet “was able to wind down more than 66,000 Lehman swap transactions in less
than [one] month”).
178 See Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 657. R
179 See id. (citing Matthew Goldstein & David Henry, Lehman: One Big Derivatives Mess,
BLOOMBERG BUSINESSWEEK (Oct. 7, 2008), http://www.businessweek.com/stories/2008-10-
07/lehman-one-big-derivatives-mess).
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systemic risk by providing the liquidity-partitioning benefits described
here.  Thus, the arrangement must cordon off short-term obligations
to pay cash to a bankrupt debtor, and it must apply the cash toward
prompt repayment of the debtor’s short-term obligations to financial
institutions.  If the obligations to pay cash to the debtor are not
short-term, then the bankruptcy might not cause cash to be misallo-
cated, as the bankruptcy case could end before the obligations come
due.  And if the debt repaid does not consist of short-term obligations
to financial institutions, then its repayment does not spare the finan-
cial sector a liquidity shock.
These observations suggest that a derivatives clearinghouse is par-
ticularly well situated to reduce systemic risk through liquidity parti-
tioning.  As noted in Part I, most derivatives contracts require that a
termination payment be made immediately when one party files for
bankruptcy.  Unusually, the payment has to be made even if it is owed
to, rather than by, the bankrupt party.180  (By contrast, most debt
agreements do not accelerate payment obligations if the lender rather
than the borrower files for bankruptcy.181)  For this reason, the obliga-
tions that a derivatives clearinghouse sets off are short-term in both
directions.  In addition, clearinghouse members are almost always fi-
nancial institutions; therefore, the accelerated cash payouts they re-
ceive via the clearinghouse will almost always improve the financial
sector’s cash ratio.  To be sure, faster payouts will not alone be suffi-
cient to save a clearinghouse member that is actually insolvent rather
than merely illiquid.  As, however, the events of 2008 suggest, illiquid-
ity rather than insolvency is the primary threat to most financial insti-
tutions during a financial crisis.182
D. Liquidity Partitioning and Clearinghouse Stability
To this point the analysis has assumed that a failed clearinghouse
member never pulls down the clearinghouse along with it.  But of
course a clearinghouse could fail in a severe crisis, potentially reduc-
ing liquidity by trapping cash in its own bankruptcy estate.  Indeed,
numerous critics have argued that the clearing mandate does little to
reduce the likelihood of future bailouts because a derivatives clearing-
house would itself be the ultimate “too-big-to-fail” financial entity
in a crisis.183  But these critics have not considered how liquidity
180 See supra text accompanying note 7. R
181 Bankruptcy accelerates the debtor’s own debts in the sense that they become
payable at the end of the bankruptcy process unless the debtor is reorganized and the debt
is reinstated.  Therefore, bankruptcy often reduces the duration of the debtor’s long-term
debts, even while it effectively increases the duration of any short-term debts that would
have come due before the case was completed.
182 See supra text accompanying notes 112–14. R
183 See Roe, supra note 6, at 1692 n.123 (collecting sources). R
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partitioning, besides accelerating cash payouts, also tends to stabilize a
clearinghouse.  Thus, history shows that clearinghouses are much
more stable than their members, including during financial crises.
And liquidity partitioning is a key reason for this stability, as it pre-
vents clearinghouses from engaging in the type of maturity transfor-
mation that leaves their members vulnerable to liquidity shortages.
Moreover, even if a clearinghouse were to fail, it would still expand
netting opportunities and thus could still reduce illiquidity and uncer-
tainty in the financial sector.
Clearinghouse failures are rare.184  No clearinghouse in the
United States has ever defaulted, despite financial crises that have
brought down large clearinghouse members.185  The 2008 crisis was
no exception: all clearinghouses avoided financial distress, including
those that cleared Lehman Brothers’ options, futures, and interest
rate swaps.186  One reason that clearinghouses are stable is that mem-
bers like Lehman tend to be dealers that maintain matched books.
The clearinghouse encourages matched books by requiring members
with unbalanced positions to post variation margin, which is costly.187
For this reason, a failed member’s liability to the clearinghouse tends
to be small.  Indeed, not only did Lehman’s bankruptcy impose no
net losses on clearinghouses, but they were able to return collateral
that Lehman had posted.188
Another reason that clearinghouses are stable is that, unlike their
members, they do not engage in maturity transformation.  Clearing-
houses accept a member’s short-term debts only to the extent that the
member can provide liquid assets as security, in the form of either
offsetting short-term claims or liquid collateral.  This is the essence of
clearinghouses’ liquidity-partitioning benefit described earlier: the
clearinghouse partitions off liquid assets and short-term debts in equal
amounts, and it uses the first to pay the second.  Members’ additional
short-term debt—and there usually will be a large amount, due to ma-
turity transformation—remains outside the clearinghouse.  As a re-
sult, outside creditors rather than the clearinghouse bear essentially
all of the risk associated with members’ illiquid assets.  Such assets are
the source not only of liquidity risk but also of most insolvency risk, as
184 Randall S. Kroszner, Can the Financial Markets Privately Regulate Risk? The Development
of Derivatives Clearinghouses and Recent Over-the-Counter Innovations, 31 J. MONEY, CREDIT &
BANKING 596, 603 (1999) (“Derivatives clearinghouses have weathered the Great Depres-
sion, the Second World War, failures of major players such as Barings, and high levels of
volatility . . . without a collapse.”).  One clearinghouse that did collapse was based in Hong
Kong; it succumbed after the Black Monday stock market collapse of 1987. See Kress, supra
note 71, at 50. R
185 Kress, supra note 71, at 65. R
186 See Acworth, supra note 177, at 34. R
187 See supra text accompanying note 18 (describing the costs of posting collateral). R
188 See Acworth, supra note 177, at 36; Chander & Costa, supra note 1, at 658. R
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illiquid assets tend to fluctuate in value more than liquid assets do.189
By avoiding exposure to fluctuations in the value of members’ illiquid
assets, the clearinghouse insulates itself from most of its members’ illi-
quidity risk and insolvency risk, which is why a member’s failure al-
most never brings down the clearinghouse itself.
The connection between clearinghouse stability and liquidity par-
titioning suggests an upper bound to the total amount of debt in the
economy that could usefully be backed by clearinghouses.  For a
clearinghouse to remain more stable than its members, it must guar-
antee their debts only to the extent that they can give the clearing-
house the first claim to a matching amount of highly liquid assets.  If a
clearinghouse instead were to guarantee all of a firm’s debt, it would
have to reach further down the left side of the firm’s balance sheet,
accepting illiquid assets as collateral.  The clearinghouse would then
bear the firm’s insolvency risk and be less stable.  At the same time,
the firm’s lenders would bear less of the firm’s insolvency risk and
would charge lower interest rates as a result.  In this way, the firm’s
cost of credit would no longer serve as an effective check on excessive
risk taking by the firm’s managers.  The clearinghouse could try to
impose that discipline—for example, by charging a fee tied to the risk-
iness of a member’s overall balance sheet—but there is reason to
doubt that a clearinghouse would be as effective as private lenders at
monitoring insolvency risk.  For these reasons, the systemic benefits of
central clearing that this Article has identified require that clearing-
houses guarantee member liabilities only to the extent that they can
be matched with highly liquid assets.  Such liabilities will necessarily
be only a small subset of the total debt in the economy.
Even if, contrary to precedent, a clearinghouse did fail during a
crisis, it still could speed up creditor payouts and thus mitigate sys-
temic risk attributable to illiquidity and uncertainty.  To see why, con-
sider again the closed-circuit example from Part I.  If trading is
bilateral (Figure 3),190 Firm A must pay $100 into Firm B’s bankruptcy
estate, and Firm C must submit a $100 proof of claim.  At this point
Firm C might or might not pay the $100 it owes to Firm A, but in
either case $100 in cash has been paid into a bankruptcy estate.  If,
however, the three trades are centrally cleared (Figure 4),191 they net
out, and Firm A does not pay cash into B’s bankruptcy estate.  And,
importantly, this remains true even if we make the additional assump-
tion that the clearinghouse is itself bankrupt.  All three firms have
189 Indeed, an asset’s tendency to fluctuate widely in value is a reason it will be illiquid,
as would-be buyers have to spend more time and resources appraising the asset before they
become willing to pay a price equal to a reasonable estimate of its expected value.
190 See supra p. 867.
191 See supra p. 868.
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mutual $100 obligations with the failed clearinghouse that they can
cancel pursuant to their setoff rights.  Therefore, neither Firm A nor
Firm C (the two solvent members) must pay cash into the bankruptcy
estate of the clearinghouse or that of the failed member (Firm B).
What has happened in this example is that netting within the
clearinghouse has effectively transformed an obligation to repay a
debt into a type of currency.  Although creditors normally must be
paid in cash, they typically are happy to accept cancellation of their
own short-term debts in satisfaction of their claims.  And netting
within a clearinghouse increases opportunities for this to occur.  Con-
sider again the closed-circuit example and imagine that the $100
owed by Firm C is represented by an IOU that Firm C has issued and
that, in a bilateral market, would be in the hands of Firm A.  Because
of netting, Firm A is, in effect, able to require Firm B to accept this
IOU in satisfaction of Firm A’s debt.  And Firm B, in turn, can use the
IOU to repay its $100 debt to Firm C.  The IOU is now back in the
hands of its issuer and hence is cancelled.  No cash has changed
hands and therefore none has been paid into a bankruptcy estate.
And because each transfer of the IOU has occurred through setoff
rights, the transfers can be made even if the clearinghouse itself is
bankrupt.  This capacity for a clearinghouse to transform a debt obli-
gation into a medium of exchange is of obvious advantage during a
liquidity shortage.
On the other hand, there will be situations in which a clearing-
house’s bankruptcy will reduce liquidity in a crisis.  This situation is
shown by the open three-firm example (Figure 2).192  Normally, the
presence of the clearinghouse prevents Firm A’s $100 payment from
entering Firm B’s bankruptcy estate, keeping the cash available for
immediate relay to Firm C.  But Firm A will have to pay the cash into
the clearinghouse’s bankruptcy estate instead if the clearinghouse has
also failed, and Firm C will have to submit a $100 proof of claim.  In
this example, the failed clearinghouse provides no evident liquidity
advantage over a bilateral market.
To generalize from these examples, we can say that a bankrupt
clearinghouse’s impact on liquidity has two components.  The
clearinghouse increases liquidity, notwithstanding its own bankruptcy,
to the extent it allows the netting of obligations from viable members
that in a bilateral market would require cash payments to bankrupt
members.  But the bankrupt clearinghouse decreases liquidity to the
extent that it does not allow netting of obligations from viable mem-
bers that in a bilateral market would require cash payments to other
viable members.  Either way, netting is the driver: the more netting
192 See supra p. 865.
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the clearinghouse permits, the greater its capacity to reduce illiquidity
and uncertainty in a crisis despite its own bankruptcy.  Previous schol-
arship has not recognized this mechanism through which a clearing-
house can reduce systemic risk even while bankrupt.
To be sure, the notion that a clearinghouse would ever be al-
lowed to enter bankruptcy is controversial at best.  As noted, many
commentators believe that a derivatives clearinghouse is the ultimate
too-big-to-fail entity and therefore would surely receive funds from the
government if it became distressed.193  The relevant point here is not
that these commentators are wrong, but rather that a distressed
clearinghouse can be a source of liquidity beyond any bailout cash it
receives.  Or put another way, the netting opportunities that a failed
clearinghouse would still create would reduce the amount of bailout
money needed to preserve the liquidity of its members.
IV
BUT DO WE NEED THE CLEARINGHOUSE?
The previous Part identified a systemic benefit of central clearing
that has been overlooked in the debate over Dodd-Frank’s clearing
mandate: through multiparty netting, a clearinghouse speeds up cash
payouts to a bankrupt firm’s counterparties, reducing systemic risk at-
tributable to illiquidity and uncertainty.  This Part considers whether
mechanisms other than central clearing could be equally effective at
providing fast, reliable payouts to derivatives counterparties, making a
clearinghouse unnecessary.  It first considers whether the same bene-
fits could be achieved with bilateral contracts, either through posted
collateral rather than multiparty netting, or by repealing provisions in
the Bankruptcy Code that currently preclude multilateral netting
without a central counterparty.  It then considers whether another
provision of Dodd-Frank—its “orderly liquidation authority” for sys-
temically important financial companies—will supplant traditional
bankruptcy in financial crises, leaving clearinghouses with little sys-
temic value to add.  In each case, the conclusion reached is that a
clearinghouse is a more reliable source of liquidity, either because
posted collateral can become illiquid in a crisis or because the
clearinghouse maintains an orderly claims structure that operates in a
mechanical and hence more predictable manner.
193 See Roe, supra note 6, at 1692 n.123; see also Julia Lees Allen, Derivatives Clearing- R
houses and Systemic Risk: A Bankruptcy and Dodd-Frank Analysis, 64 STAN. L. REV. 1079, 1103
(2012) (arguing that resolution of a clearinghouse by the FDIC under its orderly liquida-
tion authority would be a “[l]ogistical impossibility”).
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A. Contractual Alternatives: Collateral
Like the setoff right, a secured loan is an asset-partitioning ar-
rangement: it overrides the pro rata rule to give the secured creditor
the first claim to the debtor’s assets designated as collateral.194  And
while secured creditors are normally subject to bankruptcy’s auto-
matic stay, special exemptions again apply to derivatives, allowing a
party who has an open derivatives contract with the debtor to seize
and sell posted collateral immediately when the debtor files for bank-
ruptcy.195  Therefore, posted collateral should, like netting, speed up
payouts when a derivatives dealer fails.  But is collateral an equally reli-
able source of liquidity?  If it is, then the clearing mandate was seem-
ingly unnecessary, as regulators could achieve the systemic benefits
this Article has attributed to multiparty netting by aggressively exercis-
ing their power (also created by Dodd-Frank) to require that bilateral
contracts carry more collateral.196
There are several reasons that posted collateral is likely to be in-
ferior to netting as a source of financial-sector liquidity during a crisis.
Thus, when liquidity protection takes the form of collateral, a bank-
ruptcy filing still results in a misallocation of cash.  Taking again the
three-firm example, and assuming bilateral contracts bearing posted
collateral in the form of securities, Firm A would still have to pay cash
into Firm B’s estate when Firm B files for bankruptcy,197 which re-
mains a bad use of cash during a crisis for the reasons given in Part III.
Meanwhile, Firm C will typically be unable to pay its short-term credi-
tors using the securities posted by Firm B; it will need actual cash in-
stead.198  Therefore, the securities will protect Firm C from a liquidity
shock only if they can be sold quickly in a crisis.  But a crisis is pre-
cisely when normally safe collateral often becomes difficult to sell at a
price reflecting its fundamental value.199  It follows that there may be
194 See supra text accompanying notes 151–53. R
195 See supra note 159 and accompanying text. R
196 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act § 731, 7 U.S.C.
§ 6s (2012); id. § 764(a).
197 Recall that Firm B’s bankruptcy filing terminates its contract with Firm A and re-
quires Firm A to make a termination payment. See supra note 164 and accompanying text. R
Despite the fact that Firm B’s position is secured by collateral, Firm A’s payment obligation
would be in cash; Firm B would seize and try to liquidate the collateral only if Firm A
defaulted on this obligation.
198 An exception would be if the short-term creditors are repo counterparties who are
willing to accept this particular type of collateral as security.  Firm C might then be able to
satisfy these creditors by giving them the collateral instead of unwinding the repo.
199 See Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates, supra note 145, at 69 (describing how R
assets used as collateral are likely to drop in value at the same time that derivatives dealers
are likely to default on their contracts); Edwards & Morrison, supra note 74, at  102 R
(describing how posted collateral is likely to be of little value to counterparties during
times of economic distress because “prices would have collapsed long before most had a
chance to liquidate their positions”).
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a delay between when Firm B defaults and when Firm C finds cash
buyers for its collateral.  The problem will be exacerbated if a fire-sale
price spiral is underway and creditors throughout the economy are
trying to liquidate the same type of security.200  Of course, regulatory
measures that increase reliance on posted collateral will only make
such a price spiral more likely.201
What is worse, reliance on collateral could mean that a fire-sale
price spiral is the cause of Firm B’s bankruptcy in the first place.  Thus,
if the market price of the collateral securing Firm C’s contract drops,
Firm B may be contractually obligated to post more, which could
cause it to suffer a liquidity shock and fail even if it is otherwise sol-
vent.202  No similar problem would arise if the contracts among the
three firms were centrally cleared, because then the clearinghouse
would always be hedged, making collateral unnecessary.  Therefore,
by reducing reliance on posted collateral as protection against
counterparty risk, multilateral netting decreases the likelihood of li-
quidity shocks caused by fluctuations in the collateral’s market price.
Regulators could try to prevent liquidity shocks caused by fire-sale
price spirals by requiring that derivatives be secured by only the most
liquid forms of collateral, such as U.S. Treasury bonds, the price of
which actually rose during the 2008 crisis.203  But the derivatives mar-
ket is massive and there is only so much super-safe collateral to go
around.204  Moreover, a rule requiring counterparties to be fastidious
200 See Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates, supra note 145, at 69. R
201 See PIRRONG, INEFFICIENCY, supra note 24, at 23 (noting how multilateral netting can R
avoid margin “collateral/margin calls,” thereby avoiding “asset fire sales,” which in turn
“reduces the stress on market liquidity resulting from a default”).
202 See Pirrong, Clearing and Collateral Mandates, supra note 145, at 69 (noting how R
“margin increases during periods of heightened market volatility . . . . can create destabi-
lizing feedback effects”).  Firm A would also have to post more collateral to Firm B, which
Firm B might then be able to “rehypothecate” (repost) to Firm C.  But such rehypotheca-
tion would leave Firm B subject to a liquidity shock if Firm A subsequent failed.
203 See Treasury Yield Curve, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, http://www.treasury.gov/
resource-center/data-chart-center/interest-rates/Pages/Historic-Yield-Data-Visualization.
aspx (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).  On the Treasury Yield Curve, compare, for example, yields
on November 3, 2008, with those one year earlier.
204 According to the Bank of International Settlements, the “gross market value” of
derivatives that were not traded through exchanges (but that nonetheless may have been
centrally cleared) in June 2013 was $20 trillion. BANK FOR INT’L SETTLEMENTS, STATISTICAL
RELEASE: OTC DERIVATIVES STATISTICS AT END-JUNE 2013, at 2 (2013), available at http://
www.bis.org/publ/otc_hy1311.pdf.  The figure represents the cost of replacing the con-
tracts at current market prices, id., which would be approximately the same as the total
termination payments that would have been due had all contracts terminated at that point,
before accounting for netting.  Adding exchange-traded derivatives would of course in-
crease that amount.  By way of comparison, total U.S. Treasury debt held by the public on
June 30, 2013, was $12 trillion.  See The Debt to the Penny and Who Holds It, TREASURYDIRECT,
http://www.treasurydirect.gov/NP/debt/current (last visited Mar. 4, 2014).
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about collateral would only exacerbate a shortage of safe collateral in
the rest of the economy.205
When comparing the systemic advantages of collateral and net-
ting, a final point to consider is the willingness of market participants
to comply with regulations.  As Part I noted, traditional collateral is a
more expensive source of protection against counterparty risk be-
cause it requires that capital be tied up in low-risk (and hence low-
yield) securities. Parties have an incentive to avoid these costs, either
by dispensing with collateral or by using securities that are riskier (and
thus have higher yields).  Either form of evasion increases systemic
risk.  Therefore, regulations requiring that derivatives carry large
amount of safe collateral will invite creative efforts at evasion that
could cause the regulations’ effectiveness to break down in unex-
pected ways in a crisis.  Holding other considerations constant, mul-
tiparty netting is a cheaper method of protecting counterparties
against liquidity shocks,206 suggesting that rules encouraging netting
will see higher rates of compliance and thus be more effective.
B. Contractual Alternatives: Multiparty Netting Without Clearing
Multiparty netting may be better than posted collateral at perse-
vering liquidity in a crisis, but is a central counterparty needed for
multiparty netting?  As noted in Part I, a central counterparty is cur-
rently a prerequisite because the Bankruptcy Code’s allowance for set-
offs requires mutuality, meaning that the debts to be offset are owed
between the debtor and a single counterparty.207  And this require-
ment serves an important purpose, as it establishes which creditor has
the first claim to a particular debt owed to the debtor.
Without mutuality, another mechanism would be needed for
resolving priority disputes when the same debt has been pledged to
multiple creditors.  For example, imagine that Firms B and C agree
that, if Firm B files for bankruptcy, any debts that Firm A owes it on
swap contracts will go toward repaying any swap-contract debts that
Firm B owes Firm C.  Imagine further that Firm B subsequently enters
into an identical contract with Firm D.  When Firm B files for
205 Economist Gary Gorton has shown that it was the need for new types of triple-A
rated collateral that spurred the market for market-backed securities and collateralized
debt obligations backed by subprime loans, the financial instruments at the center of the
2008 crisis. GARY B. GORTON, SLAPPED BY THE INVISIBLE HAND: THE PANIC OF 2007 (2010).
Replacing the clearing mandate with rules encouraging use of highly rated collateral on all
swap contracts would again encourage financial alchemists to synthesize new securities.
206 A countervailing consideration is that central clearing requires a certain amount of
standardization across contracts, which can impose costs on an end-user if the standardized
version of a contract does not hedge its business risk precisely.  Bilateral contracts allow for
greater tailoring in this respect.
207 See supra text accompanying note 14. R
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bankruptcy, who gets to collect from Firm A: Firm C or Firm D?  For
Firm C to establish priority, it would have to have something like a
secured lien on Firm A’s debt.  This perhaps could be accomplished
through a public filing system, but the filings would become ex-
tremely complex if parties expanded them to try to create the kind of
many-firm, many-contract netting arrangements that are now possible
through clearinghouses.  As a result, even those firms that sought in
good faith to comply with their netting contracts might be unsure
whom to pay when a counterparty fails, introducing the type of delay
and uncertainty that feeds a liquidity crisis.  Mutuality cuts through
this confusion by establishing priority via possession: a creditor has the
first claim only to those debts to the debtor that the creditor itself
owes.  In this way, mutuality is like the rule whereby a secured creditor
can establish rights in collateral by taking possession of it.
As an alternative, parties could achieve multiparty netting without
a central counterparty if they were allowed to satisfy the mutuality re-
quirement by buying claims against a debtor after it files for bank-
ruptcy.  In other words, Firm A would buy Firm C’s claim after Firm B
files for bankruptcy and then set the claim off against its payment obli-
gation.  The result would seemingly be the same as that achieved by a
clearinghouse: Firm A’s cash would be intercepted on its way to the
bankruptcy estate and rerouted to Firm C.  The Bankruptcy Code pre-
cludes this result by specifying that setoff is permitted only if mutuality
existed before the bankruptcy filing.208  Would repealing this restric-
tion be a better way to realize the systemic benefits of multiparty net-
ting than requiring the use of clearinghouses?
The answer is no, which becomes evident once we make the real-
istic assumption that Firm C would not be the only creditor vying to
sell a claim to Firm A.  Rather, Firm C would have a great deal of
competition given that a firm’s total debts almost always outweigh its
own short-term claims.209  Thus, once Firm B filed for bankruptcy, the
price of claims against it would quickly be bid down.  And, problemati-
cally, creditors from outside the financial sector would bid alongside
financial-sector creditors like Firm C.  If those other creditors won,
Firm A’s cash would leave the financial sector, exacerbating rather
than mitigating a liquidity crisis.  And even if Firm C did prevail, it
would do so only by accepting the deepest discount on its claim,
thereby potentially imperiling both its liquidity and its solvency.210
More generally, there is no guarantee that post-petition claims trading
208 11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2)(A) (2012).
209 The Bankruptcy Code’s setoff right does not require that the debts that are set off
have equal maturities.
210 Firm C’s loss would be Firm A’s gain in this context, but Firm C may be under
greater liquidity pressure if the market knows that it is owed money on an open contract
with the bankrupt debtor, Firm B.
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would occur quickly enough to reassure markets that a failed firms’
financial-sector creditors will be able to sell their claims for enough
cash to keep them both liquid and solvent.  To the contrary, the
fire-sale conditions that would arise as creditors competed to sell their
claims to the bankrupt firm’s own debtors would create a great deal of
uncertainty about how much, and how quickly, each creditor might
recover on its claim, thereby exacerbating systemic risk.
A clearinghouse avoids such a scramble for liquidity because a
bankrupt member’s in-house creditors are assured that they will get
the benefit of any cash owed to that member by its in-house debtors.
Claims are converted to cash in an orderly fashion, reducing the type
of uncertainty that can trigger runs.  And the assurance of payment
also means that financial-sector creditors are not forced into a trade-
off between how much cash they receive and how quickly they receive
it, a trade-off that would only increase market anxiety about their
stability.
C. “Orderly Liquidation” as a Rapid-Resolution Alternative
According to legislative history, Dodd-Frank’s solution to the li-
quidity problems created by traditional bankruptcy is not the clearing
mandate; it is the “orderly liquidation authority” (OLA) for systemi-
cally important financial institutions.211  The OLA is modeled on the
FDIC’s traditional receivership authority over banks whose deposit ac-
counts the FDIC insures.  Dodd-Frank’s Senate Report cites congres-
sional testimony in which FDIC Chairman Sheila Bair argued that
bankruptcy is unacceptable for “systemic financial organizations” be-
cause its “timing is uncertain and the process can be complex and
protracted.”212  Bair drew a contrast with the FDIC’s receivership
mechanism for FDIC-insured banks, which can “resolve financial enti-
ties much more rapidly than under bankruptcy.”213  For the OLA to
be invoked, senior federal officials must determine that a systemically
important financial company is distressed and that allowing it to file
for bankruptcy would tend to destabilize the financial markets.214
The company is then to be placed into receivership with the FDIC,
which will have the power to manage its affairs while seeking a
211 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act §§ 201–217, 12
U.S.C. §§ 5381–5394 (2012).
212 Establishing a Framework for Systemic Risk Regulation: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Banking, Housing & Urban Affairs, 111th Cong. (2009) (Statement of Sheila C. Bair, Chair-
man, FDIC), http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/speeches/archives/2009/spjuly2309.html;
see also S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 5 (2010) (citing Chairman Bair’s statement).
213 Id.
214 Dodd-Frank Act § 203(b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012).  If the company is a
broker-dealer, the FDIC is required to appoint the Securities Investor Protection Corpora-
tion as the company’s trustee. Id.  § 205.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 56  6-MAY-14 11:35
912 CORNELL LAW REVIEW [Vol. 99:857
solution to the systemic threat.215  Judicial review is minimal: a
district court hearing a challenge to the OLA’s invocation has only
twenty-four hours to decide that federal officials abused their discre-
tion; if the court fails to act in that time, receivership begins
automatically.216
Although the OLA is modeled on traditional FDIC receivership,
the FDIC will not be able to follow its standard receivership approach
when acting under the OLA.  Under its standard approach, the FDIC
closes a failed bank late on a Friday, pays another bank to accept the
failed bank’s deposits over the weekend, and then liquidates the failed
bank’s assets over the course of several years.217  This approach would
not work for a large, systemically important financial company be-
cause the FDIC could not pay other firms to assume the distressed
company’s liabilities without putting a large amount of taxpayer funds
at risk, thereby effecting the type of bailout that Dodd-Frank is sup-
posed to prohibit.218
In recognition that its traditional receivership approach will not
work under the OLA, the FDIC has recently announced that it intends
to follow an alternative approach, which it calls a “single point of en-
try” strategy.219  Under that strategy, only the parent entity of a dis-
tressed financial company would be placed in receivership.220
Subsidiaries, which presumably would hold the company’s operational
assets and derivatives positions, would remain outside receivership
and open for business.221  If the company is insolvent, the FDIC would
convert a sufficient amount of the parent entity’s debt to equity;222 if
illiquid, the FDIC would arrange for a short-term loan from the
Treasury Department secured by a first lien on the company’s as-
sets.223  Importantly, derivatives counterparties would not be able to
treat the parent entity’s receivership as an event of default that per-
mits them to terminate their contracts.224  After solvency and liquidity
were restored, the FDIC would oversee a restructuring of the overall
215 Id.  § 204(b).
216 Id.  § 202(a)(1)(A).
217 See Hynes & Walt, supra note 157, at 988–89, 1001–03. R
218 See Dodd-Frank Act § 214(c), 12 U.S.C. § 5394 (2012) (providing that “[t]axpayers
shall bear no losses from the exercise of any authority under this title”).
219 Resolution of Systemically Important Financial Institutions: The Single Point of En-
try Strategy, 78 Fed. Reg. 76,614 (Dec. 18, 2013) [hereinafter SPOE Strategy].
220 See id. at 76,616.
221 Id.
222 See id.
223 See id.  In particular, the loans would come from the “Orderly Liquidation Fund”
that Dodd-Frank established in the Treasury Department. See id.; Dodd-Frank Act
§ 210(n), 12 U.S.C. §§ 5390 (2012).
224 See SPOE Strategy, supra note 219, at 76,616 (“[C]ounterparties to most of the fi- R
nancial company’s derivative contracts would have no legal right to terminate and net out
their contracts.”).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CRN\99-4\CRN401.txt unknown Seq: 57  6-MAY-14 11:35
2014] CLEARINGHOUSES AS LIQUIDITY PARTITIONING 913
company, which might entail splitting it into smaller entities and
winding down any unprofitable business lines.225
If all went to plan, this strategy would preserve liquidity by
preventing the seized financial company from defaulting on its
short-term debts, including its derivatives positions.  Whether the de-
rivatives contracts were bilateral or centrally cleared would then have
little systemic import.  But the success of the single-point-of-entry strat-
egy depends on a number of conditions that may not hold during a
financial crisis.  For example, it requires that the amount of debt owed
by the seized company’s subsidiaries be small enough that the com-
pany as a whole can be restored to solvency through cancellation of
only the parent entity’s debts.226  Preventing the subsidiaries of sys-
temically important financial companies from taking on too much
debt will therefore be a regulatory challenge, and it will be made
more difficult because creditors will offer lower interest rates to lend
at the subsidiary level, knowing that such debt is safer under the
single-point-of-entry strategy.  And once a company is seized, the fact
that liquidity financing from the Treasury will take the form of senior
secured loans could cause unsecured creditors at the subsidiary levels
to fear that they might ultimately take losses after all; they may there-
fore continue to run on the company despite the parent’s placement
into receivership.  Finally, the FDIC may simply lack the manpower to
pursue the strategy fully in a financial crisis if, as happened in 2008,
several large companies become distressed simultaneously.
The FDIC’s most recent statement on the single-point-of-entry
strategy acknowledges its practical limitations and thus makes clear
that the FDIC does not see the OLA as a complete bankruptcy re-
placement for systemically important firms.227  Rather, the OLA is de-
scribed as “a back-up authority” to be used only “if no viable
private-sector alternative is available” and if “a resolution through the
bankruptcy process would have serious adverse effects on U.S. finan-
cial stability.”228  Another reason that the OLA is likely to be used
sparingly is that there are concerns about its constitutionality: com-
mentators generally agree that the authority gives extraordinary pow-
ers to the federal officials,229 allowing them to place a firm in
225 See id. at 76,620.
226 See id. at 76,623.
227 See id.
228 Id. at 76,615.
229 See, e.g., Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 203(a)(1)(A), (b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012) (empowering the Treasury Secretary to desig-
nate a financial firm for orderly liquidation if, after receiving a recommendation from the
Fed and the FDIC, the Secretary determines that the firm has defaulted on its debts or is in
danger of doing so, that it presents a systemic risk, and that other options for unwinding it
would be unavailing).
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receivership and replace its directors and managers in a manner that
tests the limits of due process.230  Indeed, Dodd-Frank itself contem-
plates that the authority should be reserved for exceptional
circumstances.231
By observing that central clearing accelerates payouts to deriva-
tives counterparties, this Article has shown that a well-designed clear-
ing mandate can reduce the situations in which the OLA would need
to be invoked.  Thus, there may be financial institutions whose deriva-
tives contracts are the only systemically important aspect of their busi-
ness.  Their other operations, even if extensive, may not involve large
amounts of short-term borrowing with vulnerable financial
counterparties.  An example from the 2008 crisis is Bear Stearns,
which the Federal Reserve seems to have considered “too big to fail”
solely because of its role as a dealer in bilateral derivatives markets.232
Mandatory clearing would allow the systemically relevant operations
of such a firm to be resolved quickly in case of financial distress, mak-
ing bankruptcy an acceptable mechanism for disposing of the firm’s
other assets and liabilities.  In this way, central clearing would be a
surgical alternative to the more drastic step of FDIC receivership.
On the other hand, if the OLA were invoked, clearinghouses
could still serve a systemically valuable role.  This would be especially
true if the single-point-of-entry strategy were unable to stabilize the
seized company, perhaps because investors and counterparties re-
fused to continue transacting with subsidiaries for fear that the com-
pany remained insolvent even after all of its parent-level debt had
been converted to equity.  (Because they would take the form of se-
cured loans, cash infusions from the Treasury could solve a liquidity
problem but not a fundamental insolvency problem.)  In such a case,
clearinghouse netting would carve out a portion of the firm’s assets
and liabilities for immediate, separate resolution.  The clearinghouse
would thereby reduce the administrative burden on the FDIC during
periods when its resources are likely to be strained.  Otherwise, the
subsidiaries’ counterparties would likely suffer a liquidity shock while
230 According to Kenneth Scott, the OLA “squeezes pre-seizure due process down to
the vanishing point,” giving “unprecedented power and discretion to an administrative
official” in a manner that goes “far beyond banking law to the point of posing serious
Constitutional problems.” Kenneth Scott, Dodd-Frank: Resolution or Expropriation? 1
(Feb. 29, 2012) (unpublished manuscript), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1673849; see also Douglas G. Baird & Edward R. Morrison,
Dodd-Frank for Bankruptcy Lawyers, 19 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 296–98 (2011) (observ-
ing that the OLA raises due process concerns but concluding that it ultimately passes con-
stitutional muster).
231 See Dodd-Frank Act § 203(a), (b), 12 U.S.C. § 5383 (2012) (providing that the
Treasury Secretary can recommend that the OLA be invoked only after determining that
alternatives, such as bankruptcy or a private workout, would be ineffective).
232 See supra text accompanying note 53. R
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they waited for the FDIC to process their claims and repay them from
the receivership estate.
These observations suggest that central clearing of derivatives will
serve both as a substitute for, and complement to, the FDIC’s receiver-
ship authority under the OLA.  Central clearing of derivatives will re-
duce the need for the OLA to be invoked.  And when an OLA
receivership nonetheless proves necessary, central clearing will in-
crease its probability of success by easing the administrative burden on
the FDIC as receiver.
V
IMPLICATIONS FOR LAWMAKERS AND REGULATORS
This final Part considers implications of the Article’s thesis for a
pair of topics that are relevant to lawmakers and regulators.  The first
topic is the continuing debate over whether Congress should amend
(or repeal) the Bankruptcy Code’s special exemptions for derivatives
contracts.  The second is the question of how regulators can most ef-
fectively achieve the systemic benefits of central clearing as they issue
the rules that implement the clearing mandate.
A. Clearinghouse Liquidity and the Safe Harbors for Derivatives
The Bankruptcy Code grants special exemptions—often called
“safe harbors”—to a debtor’s derivatives counterparties.233  The ex-
emptions that relate to the automatic stay have already been noted:
these allow parties to terminate their derivatives contracts, exercise
setoff rights, and liquidate posted collateral immediately when
their counterparty files for bankruptcy.234  In addition to these
automatic-stay exemptions, the Code also exempts derivatives
counterparties from avoidance actions that a bankruptcy trustee can
normally bring to reverse preferential and fraudulent transfers.235
Legislative history suggests that Congress enacted the safe harbors to
reduce systemic risk,236 but many commentators, including this one,
have questioned whether they reliably have that effect.237
233 In addition to derivatives, the Code accords safe-harbor treatment to repo con-
tracts, which function like overnight secured loans. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 546(f), 559 (2012)
(exempting repos from rules against fraudulent and preferential transfers and from as-
pects of the automatic stay).  For a defense of the repo safe harbors, see Goralnik, supra
note 31, at 489–95 (arguing that the repo safe harbors allow repos to serve like demand R
deposits at traditional banks).
234 See supra notes 159 and accompanying text. R
235 See 11 U.S.C. § 546(g) (2012).
236 See Edwards & Morrison, supra note 74, at 93–94 (citing H.R. REP. NO. 97-420, at 1 R
(1982)).
237 See, e.g., Stephen J. Lubben, Repeal the Safe Harbors, 18 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 319,
321 (2010); Mark J. Roe, The Derivatives Market’s Payment Priorities as Financial Crisis Accelera-
tor, 63 STAN. L. REV. 539, 541 (2011); Michael Simkovic, Secret Liens and the Financial Crisis of
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This Article’s thesis implies that at least some of the safe harbors
are justified when utilized by clearinghouses in particular.  The justifi-
cation is strongest for the automatic-stay exemptions, because these
allow a clearinghouse to declare that termination payments on a bank-
rupt member’s contracts are due immediately, regardless of any mis-
match in the contracts’ underlying maturity dates.  Without these
exemptions, a clearinghouse could run out of cash if the bankrupt
member’s out-of-the-money contracts (on which the clearinghouse
would have to make payments on the member’s behalf) matured
before the member’s in-the-money contracts (on which the clearing-
house would collect from other members), even if the member’s book
was matched in terms of its positions’ net value.  And the immediate
setoff right avoids uncertainty about the clearinghouse’s ability to in-
tercept cash heading toward the member’s bankruptcy estate and re-
lay it promptly to other members.
The most forceful scholarly critique of the safe harbors has been
aimed not at these automatic-stay exemptions238 but rather at the
exemptions from the trustee’s power to avoid preferential and
fraudulent transfers.  Thus, Mark Roe has described how these
avoidance-power exemptions encourage credit runs in the form of
collateral calls.239  The paradigmatic example is AIG, which, as noted
in Part II, nearly failed for lack of liquidity in 2008 because it could
not satisfy aggressive collateral calls by its swaps counterparties.240
These counterparties had been willing to buy credit protection from
AIG without asking for initial margin because they assumed that they
could demand collateral later if, as happened, AIG’s credit rating de-
teriorated.241  Normally, collateral posted by a struggling firm is unre-
liable because, if the firm files for bankruptcy soon thereafter, the
collateral could be recalled as a preferential or fraudulent transfer.242
2008, 83 AM. BANKR. L.J. 253, 279 (2009); David A. Skeel, Jr. & Thomas H. Jackson, Essay,
Transaction Consistency and the New Finance in Bankruptcy, 112 COLUM. L. REV. 152, 189
(2012); Squire, supra note 55, at 1200–01; but see Goralnik, supra note 31, at 496–97 (argu- R
ing that the exemptions for derivatives are valuable because they promote the creation of
“‘synthetic’ mortgage-related products” such as collateralized debt obligations).
238 For example, Edwards and Morrison argue that the securities used as collateral
typically lack firm-specific value and therefore that their immediate seizure upon a debtor’s
bankruptcy filing does not threaten going-concern value, which the automatic stay ostensi-
bly exists to protect.  The authors treat this argument as an “alternative justification” for
the automatic-stay exemptions, unrelated to Congress’s concern with systemic risk. See
Edwards & Morrison, supra note 74, at 106. R
239 Roe, supra note 237, at 551, 565–66.  For an argument that the automatic-stay ex- R
emptions can also promote run-like behavior by counterparties, leading them to liquidate
collateral in a manner that could contribute to a fire-sale price spiral, see Edwards &
Morrison, supra note 74, at 101–03. R
240 See discussion supra notes 55–57. R
241 Roe, supra note 237, at 551. R
242 See 11 U.S.C. §§ 547, 550 (2012).
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Therefore, by exempting swaps from the Code’s rules against
eve-of-bankruptcy transfers, Congress encouraged AIG’s counterpar-
ties to rely on variation margin rather than initial margin,243 leading
to the type of undercapitalization that Dodd-Frank’s Senate Report
laments.  But Dodd-Frank does not repeal these avoidance-action ex-
emptions; to the contrary, it extends them to derivatives counterpar-
ties of firms that are seized through the FDIC’s orderly liquidation
authority.244
While this critique of the avoidance-action exemptions is forceful
as applied to bilateral counterparties, it does not seem as relevant to
clearinghouses, which normally do not “run” on their members.  As
described in Part II, clearinghouses are blinkered monitors whose
mechanical margin-posting rules largely disregard members’ outside
affairs, requiring variation margin to be posted based solely on
changes in the market values of in-house positions.  If a rumor were to
spread that a clearinghouse member were about to file for bank-
ruptcy, the clearinghouse would be less likely than the typical creditor
to react by aggressively demanding collateral.  It follows that a
clearinghouse would neither initiate nor participate in the type of run
that AIG suffered in 2008, both because the clearinghouse would have
demanded more initial margin (leaving it less undersecured once the
market turned against the member) and because it would have been
less likely to act based on rumors as contrasted with real price move-
ments (though the former can cause the latter).
In view of netting’s superiority to posted collateral as a source
of liquidity in a crisis, the eligibility of clearinghouses for the
automatic-stay exemptions, which enable rapid netting, seem more
systemically important than their eligibility for the avoidance-action
exemptions, which apply primarily to margin collection.245  Nonethe-
less, posted margin remains important as a backup source of clearing-
house liquidity given that members cannot perpetually maintain
matched books.246  And forcing clearinghouses to return collateral af-
ter a member files for bankruptcy would reduce the clearinghouse’s
liquidity to the extent that the securities serving as collateral have
243 See Roe, supra note 237, at 566 (arguing that AIG’s derivatives counterparties would R
have been “better incentivized to have a strong credit structure early on” had they not been
able to “grab and keep eve-of-bankruptcy preferences.”).
244 See Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act
§ 210(c)(8)(C)(i), 12 USC § 5390 (2012).
245 The Code does contain a few anti-preference rules that apply to setoffs rather than
transfers of assets such as collateral.  Thus, the Code disallows setoff if, during the ninety
days before the debtor’s bankruptcy petition, the creditor’s claim against the debtor was
transferred to the creditor by someone other than the creditor or was incurred for the
purpose of obtaining a setoff right.  Once again, derivatives counterparties are exempt. See
11 U.S.C. § 553(a)(2), (3) (2012).
246 See supra Part I.A.2.
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remained liquid in a crisis.  (It would also be a misallocation of a liq-
uid asset during a crisis for the reasons given in Part III.)  Combined
with the fact that a clearinghouse is unlikely to participate in a run on
its members, these observations suggest that the avoidance-action ex-
emptions may also be justified when utilized by clearinghouses in
particular.247
On the other hand, this Article’s thesis suggests that the safe
harbors should not be available to nonfinancial companies, which do
not engage in maturity transformation and therefore have no struc-
tural reason to need to maintain low cash ratios.  By using the avoid-
ance-action exemptions to drain liquid collateral from a financial
institution, a nonfinancial company could exacerbate a financial cri-
sis.  Dodd-Frank already recognizes the relevance of the distinction
between financial and nonfinancial firms by providing an end-user ex-
emption to the clearing mandate, under which a swaps contract need
not be centrally cleared if one party to the swap is not a financial insti-
tution and is using it to hedge commercial risk.248  The logic of this
distinction implies that Congress should consider narrowing the safe
harbors so that they are not available to companies that would qualify
for this end-user exemption.249
B. Implementing the Mandate to Maximize Liquidity
Regulators are still implementing Dodd-Frank by translating its
general directives into specific rules.  One implication of this Article’s
thesis is that regulators should not adopt the Senate report’s view that
the primary systemic function of the clearing mandate is to increase
collateral postings on swaps contracts.  Collateral can become illiquid
in a crisis and, through forced selling, exacerbate a fire-sale price spi-
ral, further destabilizing the financial sector.250  Instead, regulators
should use the clearing mandate to maximize netting opportunities,
which would more reliably reduce illiquidity and uncertainty when a
clearinghouse member fails.
As a general rule, netting opportunities increase with the ratio of
the number of cleared contracts to the number of clearinghouses.
Regulators could increase this ratio by shrinking its denominator,
247 Darrell Duffie also argues that clearinghouses’ eligibility for the safe harbors is sys-
temically beneficial; he emphasizes the need for clearinghouses to be able to liquidate
collateral promptly. See Darrell Duffie & David Skeel, A Dialogue on the Costs and Benefits of
Automatic Stays for Derivatives and Repurchase Agreements, in BANKRUPTCY Not Bailout: A Spe-
cial Chapter 14, at 133 (Kenneth E. Scott and John B. Taylor eds., 2012).
248 See Dodd-Frank Act § 723(a)(2), 7 U.S.C. § 2(h)(7)(A) (2012); § 763(a).
249 Other scholars have similarly argued that the eligibility of non-financial companies
for the safe harbors is particularly difficult to justify. See, e.g., Lubben, supra note 237, at R
328.
250 See supra notes 199–200 and accompanying text. R
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in the extreme case by forcing all derivatives through a single
clearinghouse.  But competition among clearinghouses has the advan-
tage of encouraging innovations that reduce operating costs.251  And,
as Roberta Romano has described, international variation in financial
regulation can provide systemic benefits by reducing risk correlations
across borders.252  This benefit of international regulatory competi-
tion would be lost if all trading were confined to a single clearing-
house subject to a single regulatory regime.253
These observations suggest that the better way to raise the con-
tracts-per-clearinghouses ratio is to increase the numerator by subject-
ing more categories of swaps to the clearing mandate.  To date, the
CFTC has designated for mandatory clearing only four categories of
interest rate swaps and two categories of credit default swaps.254  If the
mandate remains this narrow in scope, it could actually reduce rather
than increase netting opportunities.  Thus, in bilateral markets, pairs
of counterparties can engage in multicategory netting, meaning that
they can agree to net out positions across contract types if they have
more than one type of mutual contract.255  Multicategory netting is
distinct from multiparty netting, which is what central clearing makes
possible.  To be sure, a clearinghouse can also engage in multicat-
egory netting if it accepts multiple contract types.  But if the clearing-
house clears only a few categories, it could reduce overall netting, with
the multiparty netting opportunities it creates outweighed by the mul-
ticategory netting opportunities it precludes.256  Therefore, the right
approach to the clearing mandate is suggested by the aphorism “in for
a dime, in for a dollar”: regardless of whether the mandate was a good
idea as an initial matter, now that the legislative commitment has
251 FRENCH ET AL., supra note 117, at 117. R
252 Roberta Romano, For Diversity in the International Regulation of Financial Institutions:
Critiquing and Recalibrating the Basel Architecture 77–78 (Yale Law & Econ., Research Paper
No. 452, Mar. 11, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=
2127749.
253 See Sean J. Griffith, Substituted Compliance and Systemic Risk: How to Make a
Global Market in Derivatives Regulation 37 (2012) (unpublished article) (on file with au-
thor) (describing dangers of uniformity in international regulation of swap
clearinghouses).
254 See Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed.
Reg. 74,284, 74,336–37 (Dec. 13, 2012) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pts. 39, 50).  The report
states that the CFTC intends to consider adding other swap categories in the future. Id. at
74,287.
255 See 11 U.S.C. § 561(a)(6) (2012) (providing safe-harbor protection for “master net-
ting agreements” that cover securities contracts, commodities contracts, and derivatives);
FRENCH ET AL., supra note 117, at 116–17 (noting that many parties now rely on bilateral R
master swap agreements that permit netting of mutual exposures across multiple contract
types).
256 Darrell Duffie & Haoxiang Zhu, Does a Central Clearing Counterparty Reduce
Counterparty Risk?, 1 REV. ASSET PRICING STUD. 74, 76–77 (2011) (describing how the clear-
ing mandate could undermine bilateral cross-category netting).
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been made, regulators would do more harm than good if they created
a limited mandate that reduced overall netting opportunities.  Regula-
tors could widen netting opportunities not only by adding more swap
categories to the mandate but also by discouraging the formation of
specialist clearinghouses that clear only particular contract types.257
A broad mandate will also tend to ease the burden on the FDIC
in the exercise of its receivership powers under the orderly liquidation
authority.  Because clearinghouses are themselves rapid, orderly liqui-
dators, transferring a financial company’s bilateral swaps to a clearing-
house reduces the number of assets and liabilities that the FDIC
would have to evaluate when deciding how to resolve the company’s
difficulties in receivership.  Indeed, as Part IV argued, a broad clear-
ing mandate could keep some distressed firms out of receivership alto-
gether, a result that should be favored by observers who question both
the constitutionality and the practical implications of the wide discre-
tion that Dodd-Frank’s OLA grants federal officials.
While the clearing mandate should be broad in terms of which
contracts it covers, a different analysis applies to the question of whose
contracts it should cover.  Although the end-user exemption has been
criticized on grounds that it invites abuse by parties seeking to evade
the mandate,258 it makes sense in theory as a means of keeping clear-
inghouses stable.  Unlike financial companies that serve as derivatives
dealers, end-users do not try to maintain matched books.  Rather, they
primarily use derivatives to hedge an underlying business risk.  This
means that an end-user’s derivatives positions tend to be positively
correlated, increasing the likelihood that, if the end-user is a clearing-
house member and files for bankruptcy, it will have a large debit or
credit with the clearinghouse.  Either could cause the clearinghouse
to suffer a liquidity shock.  If a debit, the clearinghouse will have to
make a large cash payment to the end-user’s in-house creditors, which
would drain the clearinghouse of cash if the end-user’s posted collat-
eral is inadequate or cannot be sold quickly.  If a credit, the clearing-
house will have to make a large cash payment to the end-user’s
bankruptcy estate, which could be destabilizing if the end-user’s
in-house counterparties fail to pay their debts promptly.  Thus, to in-
sulate clearinghouses from liquidity risk, it would make sense for regu-
lators to encourage clearinghouses to limit membership to derivatives
dealers, and to permit clearinghouses to decline contracts offered for
257 Almost all central clearing of credit default swaps occurs through four clearing-
houses: ICE Clear Credit, ICE Clear Europe, CME Group, and LCH Clearnet Limited.
Clearing Requirement Determination Under Section 2(h) of the CEA, 77 Fed. Reg. at
74,287, 74,300.  These clearinghouses handle other derivatives as well, including the inter-
est rate swaps now subject to the clearing mandate.  Id. at 74,290, 74,300.
258 See id. at 74,284, 74,317 (discussing the potential for parties to abuse the end-user
exemption to evade the clearing mandate).
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clearing if one counterparty appears unlikely to be able to maintain
something close to a matched book.259
CONCLUSION
In a financial crisis, bankruptcy solves one liquidity problem by
creating others.  When a firm files for bankruptcy, the automatic stay
blocks the collection efforts of its creditors, alleviating the firm’s im-
mediate need for cash.  But its creditors are thereby deprived of li-
quidity, which will imperil them if they are financial institutions
that have low cash ratios and are susceptible to runs by their own
short-term claimants.  The result could be “contagion,” with the bank-
ruptcy of one firm producing liquidity shocks that cause other firms to
fail as well.
A clearinghouse, which acts as a central counterparty for dealers
in financial contracts, improves cash allocation in a crisis.  When one
of its members files for bankruptcy, the clearinghouse engages in li-
quidity partitioning: it cordons off cash owed to the member and a
matching amount of the member’s short-term debts, and it uses the
first to repay the second.  As a result, cash that otherwise would enter
the bankruptcy estate (where demand for liquidity is low) is diverted
to financial-sector creditors (whose demand for liquidity is high).
Like a bailout, the clearinghouse improves the financial sector’s cash
ratio.  It does so, however, not by increasing the numerator (cash
holdings) but rather by decreasing the denominator (short-term
debt).  Thus, rather than injecting new funds into the economy, the
clearinghouse makes better use of cash already in private hands.  Not
only does the clearinghouse thereby reduce illiquidity, but it also
reduces uncertainty about the impact of bankruptcy on the failed
firm’s financial-sector creditors, decreasing the risk that they will suf-
fer runs by their own short-term creditors.
Although Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate for swaps contracts has
been the subject of a wide debate, previous commentators have over-
looked the liquidity-partitioning benefits of central clearing.  Instead,
the clearing mandate’s proponents have focused on how clearing-
houses redistribute balance-sheet losses, an effect that is zero-sum in
its impact on creditors.  Central clearing’s impact on liquidity, by con-
trast, constitutes unambiguous value creation: some creditors are paid
259 The implication is that Bear Stearns and Lehman Brothers were good candidates
for clearinghouse membership but AIG was not, since the former were dealers with
matched books while AIG took large, one-sided positions on the credit default swaps it
sold. See id.  The better approach with an insurer like AIG is prudential regulation (which
would limit the insurer’s overall balance-sheet risk), perhaps combined with a scaling back
of the safe harbors as applied to uncleared swaps so that the insurer’s counterparties will
do more to discourage the insurer from engaging in excessive risk taking.
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more quickly, and no creditors are paid more slowly, than they would
be without the clearinghouse.  Indeed, the clearinghouse reduces the
size of the failed firm’s bankruptcy estate, which eases the administra-
tive burden on the trustee and could lead to faster payouts for non-
clearinghouse creditors a well.
Liquidity partitioning is also the reason that clearinghouses have
historically been much more stable than their members.  Thus, many
observers have argued that Dodd-Frank’s clearing mandate will do lit-
tle to prevent future bailouts because clearinghouses are themselves
“too big to fail.”  But these critics overlook an important difference
between clearinghouses and other financial institutions such as banks
and money-market mutual funds.  The latter types of institution are
vulnerable during crises because they engage in maturity transforma-
tion: they borrow short-term and invest the proceeds in long-term,
illiquid assets.  A clearinghouse, by contrast, has a temporally matched
balance sheet that consists only of short-term assets and liabilities.
Critics also have not observed how even a bankrupt clearinghouse
creates opportunities for multiparty netting and thereby keeps cash
from becoming trapped in a bankruptcy proceeding.
By identifying faster payouts as the primary economic benefit of
central clearing, this Article has revealed how Dodd-Frank’s clearing
mandate can work in conjunction with another one of its controver-
sial provisions: its orderly liquidation authority for systemically risky
financial companies.  Legislative history indicates that the function of
the orderly liquidation authority is to resolve failed firms quickly dur-
ing a financial crisis.  But the authority has been criticized due to the
vast and largely unreviewable powers it gives government officials to
seize and liquidate a firm and fire its managers, even before the firm
has defaulted on its debts.  Critics of the orderly liquidation authority
should support a broad clearing mandate, as clearinghouses also are
rapid, orderly liquidators, but they follow predictable rules for resolv-
ing claims that leave little discretion either to officials or to clearing-
house managers.  In other words, clearinghouses are both substitutes
for and complements to the FDIC in its role as liquidator: they can
obviate seizure by the FDIC, and if a firm is seized they can reduce the
FDIC’s workload in resolving it.
The observation that clearinghouses create value primarily by re-
ducing illiquidity in a crisis has important implications for the
rulemakers who are implementing the clearing mandate.  Those
rulemakers should disregard the legislative history’s view that the
clearing mandate’s function is to increase collateral postings; securi-
ties used for collateral can suddenly become illiquid in times of dis-
tress, as the recent crisis demonstrated.  Instead, clearinghouses
should be structured to maximize netting opportunities among
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members, which will occur if a wide variety of contracts are cleared
through relatively few central counterparties.  At the same time, nonfi-
nancial companies should not be allowed to become clearinghouse
members, an observation consistent with the clearing mandate’s ex-
emption for end-users.  Such companies do not engage in maturity
transformation and therefore do not tend to suffer the type of liquid-
ity shortage that a clearinghouse alleviates.  Nonfinancial companies
also do not maintain matched books and thus are more likely to bring
down the clearinghouse with them if they fail.
Considered in the context of broader trends, greater reliance on
clearinghouse netting to speed up insolvency proceedings would be
consistent with the ongoing search among both market participants
and policymakers for alternatives to the traditional model of business
bankruptcy.  Under that model, a bankrupt firm’s obligations are re-
solved through a grand bargain that is negotiated among managers
and investors.  For example, the trend among market participants
in the last twenty-five years has been to favor quick asset sales over
drawn-out, negotiated Chapter 11 reorganizations.260  Among govern-
ment officials, dissatisfaction with traditional bankruptcy was evident
even before the 2008 crisis in Congress’s decision to exempt deriva-
tives from key Bankruptcy Code provisions.261  And, of course, the
2008 bailouts reflected doubt among officials about the adequacy of
traditional bankruptcy, as did the inclusion of the orderly liquidation
authority in Dodd-Frank.262  The clearing mandate is consistent with
this trend, as central clearing partitions a portion of a failed firm’s
assets in a manner that keeps the assets outside the bankruptcy pro-
ceeding and under the control of a separate entity, the clearinghouse,
that can distribute them to creditors more quickly.
260 See Douglas G. Baird & Robert K. Rasmussen, Reply, Chapter 11 at Twilight, 56 STAN.
L. REV. 673, 678–79 (2003).
261 See supra Part III.B.
262 See supra notes 212–13 and accompanying text. R
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